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Abstract
This paper advances our collective knowledge about the role of learning in retail
agglomeration. Uncertainty about new markets provides an opportunity for sequential
learning, where one rms past entry decisions signal to others the potential protability
of risky markets. The setting is Canadas hamburger fast food industry from its early
days in 1970 to 2005, for which simple analysis of my unique data reveals empirical
patterns pointing towards retail agglomeration. The notion that uninformed potential
entrants have an incentive to learn, but not informed incumbents, motivates an intuitive
double-di¤erence approach that separately identies learning by exploiting di¤erences
in the way potential entrants and incumbents react to spillovers. This identication
strategy conrms that information externalities are key drivers of agglomeration. Esti-
mates from a dynamic oligopoly model of entry with information externalities provide
further evidence of learning, as I show that common uncertainty matters. Counterfac-
tual analysis reveals that an industry with uncertainty is initially less competitive than
an industry with certainty, but catches up over time. Furthermore, there are many
instances in which chains enter markets they would have avoided had they not faced
uncertainty. Finally, consistent with the interpretation of uncertainty as an entry bar-
rier, I nd that chains place signicant premiums on certainty at proportions beyond
2% of their total value from being monopolists.
Keywords: Agglomeration, commercial real estate investment, dynamic discrete choice game,
entry and exit, investment delay, market structure, retail competition.
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1 Introduction
The notion of a symbiotic relationship between rival entities is hard to rationalize under traditional
models of oligopoly competition with entry deterrence (Schmalensee, 1978). Yet clustering of (seem-
ingly competitive) retail establishments is commonly observed, and has been well-documented by
researchers: Burger King persistently opens new stores near existing McDonalds outlets (Toivanen
and Waterson, 2005), and anchor stores tend to enter the same malls (Vitorino, 2008). Although
such patterns provide convincing evidence of agglomeration, our knowledge about the causes under-
lying these patterns remains incomplete. Identifying the cause of agglomeration1 is a challenging
task due to the multitude of potential hypotheses. Unobserved heterogeneity and demand external-
ities are typical explanations for retail clustering. A nearby mall, local attraction, or highway exit
can easily generate retail agglomeration among rivals (Thomadsen, 2007), as can restrictive retail
zoning provisions (Datta and Sudhir, 2011) - both factors pointing to unobserved heterogeneity.
Alternatively, a store may generate demand externalities for neighboring rivals if its presence helps
draw in additional consumer tra¢ c (Datta and Sudhir, 2011; Eppli and Benjamin, 1994; Konishi,
2005), or if its close proximity can credibly soften price competition via market segmentation or
cannibalization2 concerns (Thomadsen, 2010; Zhu, Singh and Dukes, 2011).3
Despite the well-developed theoretical literature on social learning and learning-from-others,4
empirical research on retail agglomeration has overlooked the idea that if managers face uncertainty
about market protability, then they may have an incentive to take advantage of any information
that can possibly be revealed when an existing and informed chain decides to stay or exit a market.
My objective is to establish the role of these information externalities in generating retail clustering,
along with implications that uncertainty and such externalities have on an industrys evolution.
From a managers perspective, learning from the actions of others is potentially a protable and cost-
saving strategy, as retail chains spend considerable resources on real estate research. In particular,
observing that a rival has failed in a particular market allows them to avoid sub-optimal choices
and focus their attention on more promising investments.5 Of interest to competition authorities,
1For a perspective from urban economics, refer to Rosenthal and Stranges (2004) survey and the recent study by
Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010).
2For example, if a market has one McDonalds outlet, and one Burger King outlet, the entry of one additional
McDonalds outlet can actually benet both chains. The additional McDonalds outlet will induce McDonalds to
price less competitively so as to avoid cannibalizing its original stores sales.
3On a related note, Sen, Shin and Sudhir (2011) nd evidence of real monetary e¤ects associated with demand
externalities.
4Literature that builds on Caplin and Leahy (1998), and Chamley and Gale (1994).
5The oft-cited newspaper article by Deutsch (1993) claims that the observable success of a Bed, Bath and Beyond
outlet was a key factor that induced other retailers to set up shop in a New York neighborhood.
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Figure 1: Total number of outlets opened/closed in Canada over time.
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information externalities may even reduce the impact of ex ante uncertainty as an entry barrier.
This paper studies entry/exit decisions of the ve major fast food chains in Canada - A &
W, Burger King, McDonalds, and Wendys, along with the Canadian chain Harveys - from the
industrys beginning6 around 1970 to 2005 (Section 2). As Canada is the rst foreign market
many of the American chains explored, it is likely that managers faced some uncertainty early on.
Combined with (unusually) large time-series variation in both entry and exit (Figure 1),7 these
features make Canadas ever-evolving fast food industry a particularly attractive setting to study
the relationship between learning and agglomeration.
Section 3 presents three empirical regularities. First, a chains growth rate in a local market is
positively associated with the past size of its rivals. Second, entry occurs earlier in local markets
initially endowed with rival incumbents. And nally, the incumbency status of a chain has a
positive e¤ect on its rivalsdecisions to enter a local market, even when (time-varying) unobserved
heterogeneity is accounted for. A consistent theme throughout this empirical analysis is that fast
food chains tend to follow their rivals into markets. These patterns are certainly suggestive of
clustering and the existence of spillovers.
Credible identication of information externalities is particularly challenging given perfectly
valid alternative hypotheses involving demand externalities and unobserved heterogeneity. To guide
6Other studies that investigate empirical patterns in retail industry dynamics are Eckert and West (2008) and
Kosová and Lafontaine (2010), both of which are motivated by the theoretical framework of Jovanovic (1982).
7Large relative to other retail industries, such as general merchandise and grocery. For instance, about 17% of all
actions in my sample are decisions to exit a market. Compare this number with Beresteanu, Ellickson, and Misras
(2010) study about supermarkets that observes exit in about 4% of their observations.
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my identication approach, I rst present a dynamic oligopoly model of entry8 that allows for
common uncertainty and information externalities in Section 4.9 The basic idea of the model is
that ex ante, chains face uncertainty about market size and can at best obtain a forecast based
on observable market characteristics. This uncertainty is resolved after entry, as incumbents will
observe the true market size.10 The decisions of incumbents will be made without uncertainty
about market size, thereby giving rivals who have not yet entered an opportunity to learn from
these observed stay/exit decisions.
Straightforward intuition consistent with the model suggests a semi-parametric double-di¤erence
decomposition that can be used to identify learning (Section 5).11 The assumption that uncertainty
is resolved upon entry will provide an incentive for uninformed potential entrants to learn, but not
informed incumbents. Non-learning factors, such as unobserved heterogeneity or demand external-
ities, will a¤ect both potential entrants and incumbents alike.12 Therefore, a potential entrants
reaction to its rivals stay/exit decision will be driven by both learning and non-learning factors,
while an incumbents reaction to its rivals stay/exit decision will only be driven by non-learning fac-
tors. The di¤erence in how a potential entrant and incumbent reacts to its rivals stay/exit decision
will net out the non-learning e¤ects, thereby isolating the contribution of learning. This approach
demonstrates that information externalities are larger than the other e¤ects; hence, learning is a
key driver of retail agglomeration in Canadas hamburger fast food industry. Furthermore, these
externalities a¤ect each chain di¤erently, which I explore in more detail with structural estimation.
I take advantage of structural estimation in Section 6 to show that the fast food chains do indeed
face ex ante uncertainty, which is a necessary condition for learning.13 Subsequent counterfactual
analysis in Section 7 allows me to assess the implications of uncertainty for market structure and
chain protability. By simulating a counterfactual equilibrium for which the degree of ex ante
8Other papers that estimate structural models pertaining to retail chains include Ellickson, Houghton and Timmins
(2010), Holmes (2011), Jia (2008), Nishida (2008), Suzuki (2010), Toivanen and Waterson (2005, 2011), Varela (2010),
and Zhu, Singh and Duke (2011).
9For a summary of research about learning, refer to Ching, Erdem and Keane (2011).
10For example, a manager will nd out through realized revenue reports the true protability of markets.
11Other attempts at identifying social learning include: computer purchase decisions (Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002),
educational product adoption (Forbes, 2009), employment adjustments (Guiso and Schivardi, 2007), entry into work
among women (Fogli and Veldkamp, 2008), farming technology adoption (Conley and Udry, 2010), HIV/AIDS risk
perception (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins, 2007), home sales (Tucker, Zhang, and Zhu, 2009), internet adoption
(Ward, 2010), kidney adoption (Zhang, 2010), macroeconomic policy choice (Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri,
2010), momentum e¤ects in sequential elections (Knight and Schi¤, 2007), movie sales (Moretti, 2010), predatory
behavior of incumbent airlines (Kim, 2009), ranking of college football teams (Stone and Zafar, 2011), SARS risks
(Bennett, Chiang, and Malani, 2011), stock purchasing decisions (Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2007), Twitter adoption
among politicians (Chi and Yang, 2010), and word of mouth in online book sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006).
12For example, the additional tra¢ c generated by the presence of a neighboring local attraction or rival benets a
chain, regardless of whether it just recently entered the market, or has been active for a number of years.
13Refer to the Appendix.
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uncertainty is set to zero, I nd that an industry is less competitive with uncertainty than without
uncertainty during the rst 20 years; however, we see a convergence towards the scenario with
certainty over time. It has often been thought that rst movers into markets are predisposed to
creating entry barriers for future entrants (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé, 2009). But as I illustrate
with this counterfactual simulation, when retail establishments face entry barriers related to unin-
surable risk, the presence of incumbent rivals may reduce these barriers through the information
externalities. Ultimately, the existence of these exploitable features naturally regulates markets and
most likely contributes to the competitiveness of Canadas fast food industry (Figure 2). If rms are
able to resolve their uncertainty through learning, then the presence of rival incumbents could ac-
tually be welfare-improving. Entering ex post unprotable markets followed by exit is suboptimal,
and my counterfactual analysis shows that uncertainty is a key driver for such market ine¢ ciencies
as an industry with uncertainty is associated with over 2% more entry/exit in comparison to an
industry without uncertainty. However, these ine¢ ciencies are less pronounced in the latter years
as rms are less likely to enter markets they would have avoided under full information.
The counterfactual analysis also demonstrates that chains place a premium on certainty at levels
exceeding their entry costs, providing further evidence that ex ante uncertainty is a signicant entry
barrier. In fact, these premiums constitute a non-negligible proportion of a monopolists value in a
local market of median size. Finally, variation in the way chains value a reduction in uncertainty
could explain some of the variation in chainsreactions to information externalities as illustrated
by the double-di¤erence decomposition. In particular, the chain that reacts the least (most) to
information externalities also places the least (most) value on uncertainty reduction.
2 Data
2.1 Canadas hamburger fast food industry
This study investigates local competition between fast food outlets that primarily serve hamburgers.
I focus my attention on the ve largest chains operating in Canada: A & W, Burger King, Harveys,
McDonalds and Wendys. In Canada, no other chains with national presence entered the industry
but failed as a whole, so, the set of ve chains I look at is very representative of hamburger fast
food chains in Canada. Note that there exist quick-service outlets that do not serve hamburgers,
such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, Subway, and Taco Bell, which I leave out from my analysis largely
because the products o¤ered by hamburger chains are likely to be more substitutable with one
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Figure 2: Evolution of market shares in Canadas fast food industry.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
A & W Burger King
Harvey's McDonald's
Wendy's
another.14
Since 1970, Canada has become a very important foreign market for American retail chains.
Canada provides American chains a real growth option,15 without the risk associated with more ex-
otic markets overseas (Holmes, 2010). Not surprisingly, American chains tend to launch in Canada
rst, before they expand to other countries (Smith, 2006); this strategy is a general phenomenon
seen in the entire retail industry. In fact, McDonalds was largely motivated to expand globally
after its success in Canada (Love, 1995). Using Canada as a stepping stone, all four of the American
chains are currently active players in the global fast food industry. Today, McDonalds has almost
31,000 outlets around the world, Burger King has 4,000 outlets, then A & W follow with about 700,
and 400 for Wendys internationally. The largest domestic chain, Harveys, boasts a store count of
over 200 outlets in Canada.
Many of these franchises were founded in the United States prior to 1970. A &W in 1956, Burger
King in 1952, McDonalds in 1952, and Wendys in 1969; Canadas chain Harveys was founded
in 1959. The rst American chains to set up in Canada were A & W (1956), and McDonalds
(1967). Although their relative standings have changed over time, these ve chains are still the
14Furthermore, these chains are late entrants into Canada relative to the hamburger chains. Although Kentucky
Fried Chicken was available as early as 1953, it was primarily served through convenience stores until the 1980s.
Subways rst outlet in Canada was opened in 1986, while Taco Bells rst outlet in Canada was opened in 1981.
15Franchised chain growth in Canada is still markedly smaller than growth in America. Kosová and Lafontaine
(2010) show that growth is about 29 percentage points lower in Canada as compared to the States.
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most dominant forces in Canadas fast food industry today.
While franchisees have some freedom with respect to own-store pricing and promotions, the
location decisions are made by the chain.16 In particular, a typical fast food chain will have a real
estate research team which is assigned to this task. During expansionary periods, this part of the
company is quite large; so much so that each team member has a specic region that he overlooks.
2.2 Local market denition and observable characteristics
I consider a Forward Sortation Area (FSA) as a local market. FSA designations are dened as
the rst three digits of a postal code and are loosely based on population.17 An FSA can be as
large as a small city, or can be one of many subdivisions in a large metropolitan city.18 The FSA
regions I consider are those nested within Canadas Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). Loosely
speaking, a CMA is a (major) city in Canada. My set of CMAs covers all of the provinces in
Canada, although a large proportion of them are concentrated in the province of Ontario. Note
that the FSAs are the largest subdivisions that I am able to nd for my set of CMAs.19 I nd 608
FSA markets based on the cities used in my sample.
I later match the market structure data with proxies for market size. The rst variable is FSA
population, which is available from the Census Proles for the years 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and
2006. I impute20 the missing years using the inferred population growth rates. Table 1 summarizes
the market characteristics that I use for the analysis. Additional information from the Census
includes the average income (in Canadian dollars) of an FSA market, the average property value
for each market, as well as the percentage of residents who work in/out of an FSA market.21
Property value is used as a proxy for the cost of purchasing a location to house a fast food outlet.
16Franchisees can own multiple contracts with the fast food chains. The concentration of ownership has implications
on the prices paid by consumers (Thomadsen, 2005).
17FSAs are on average 1.8 square miles in many Canadian cities, and thus, comparable to American Census Tracts.
Note that these markets are smaller than those used in other studies on retail competition and agglomeration. For
example, Toivanen and Waterson (2005) use Local Authority Districts in the United Kingdom, which are equivalent
to cities. Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010) use Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Counties, and States; all of
which are larger than FSAs.
18Refer to the Appendix for a graphical example displaying the FSA regions for the city of Toronto.
19Population ranges from 44 to 89,696 people.
20 I impute the population in 1999 using the inferred exponential population growth rate between 1996 and 2001,
and the population in 1990 using the exponential growth rate between 1991 and 1996. Observations before 1986 are
imputed using a convex combination of the national growth rate and the growth rate pertaining to 1986 to 1991.
I place a greatest weight on the annual national growth rate for years closest to 1970, and greatest weight on the
1986-1991 growth rate for years approaching 1986. I am also able to obtain the geographic area (in sq km) for each
FSA from the Census of Canada. These values are later used to calculate the population density for each FSA market.
21 I impute income and property value in a similar manner as population. The di¤erence is that for the years before
1986, I use a convex combination of the national ination rate and the rate of return pertaining to 1986 to 1991.
Because the proportion of residents who work in/out of an FSA market was not available for each Census, I use the
information available for 2006.
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Past studies have shown that fast food chains prefer markets with poorer inhabitants.22
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Population (persons) 20,333 11,206 44 89,686
Population density (persons per sq km) 2,344.034 3,487.339 0.186 144,908.844
Total sales (billion CDN) 1.087 1.100 0.001 9.155
Total retail locations 449 377 3 2,904
Income (dollars) 62,889.79 23,181.81 12,611.58 469,121
Property value (million CDN) 0.320 0.225 0.014 3.340
University (dummy) 0.054 0.225 0 1
Proportion work in same FSA 0.58 0.287 0 1
N 21,528
I supplement the Census data with the Small Area Retail Trade Estimators (SARTE). These
data contain information on annual total retail sales and total number of retail locations in a
given FSA region, which should partially control for heterogeneity in retail activity across markets.
This counts all retail locations that belong to chains with at least 4 stores. SARTE is the most
reliable dataset of retail sales at such a disaggregated level. However, its time series variation
might not be reliable.23 Consequently, I use the 2002 survey and use it as a control for permanent
cross-sectional heterogeneity. As a nal control for market protability, I include a dummy variables
which indicates whether an FSA contains an accredited university. Given that fast food chains often
target young adults in their ads, I can identify whether they actually locate near these populations.
Note that all of the universities in my sample were established well before 1970.
My sample contains a number of markets which may be not be conducive to retail. For example,
zoning regulation may prohibit retail from operating in certain FSAs; alternatively, certain FSAs
may be very undeveloped and deserted.24 To rule out these markets, I exclude from my sample
markets that have either zero retail sales/locations, population, or income.25 After these inclusions,
the number of observations is reduced from 21,888 to 21,528. As population and income changes
over time, I only include market-time observations of years for which population and income are
positive.
22Refer to Block, Scribner, and DeSalvo (2004) and Powell, Chaloupka, and Bao (2007).
23Unlike the households surveyed in the Canadian Census, each chain establishment operating in a particular FSA
is not surveyed. Instead, a sample of them are chosen; and each year, this sample is di¤erent. Furthermore, data
from multiple years is hard to match as the FSAs covered in one year di¤ers from FSAs covered in another year.
Thus,I chose the year that had the best coverage.
24This may especially be the case for small cities around the 1970s.
25A more direct way of identifying retail markets would be to use geographic zoning data as in Datta and Sudhir
(2011). Unlike the United States, high quality zoning data is hard to nd for Canadian municipalities.
8
2.3 Market structure data
I turned to archived phone books at the City of Torontos Reference Library26 for information
about each outlets location, time of opening, and if applicable, time of closing. There, I am able to
nd series of phone books, from 1970 to 2005 for virtually all 33 of the CMAs in Canada. Searches
based on CMAs are necessary as the library does have complete series for the smaller Census Areas
(CAs). Note that the CMAs of Sherbrooke, Saguenay and Trois-Rivieres are left out because of
missing phone directories over certain time intervals. This method allows me to identify:
1. Opening year: The rst year in which a particular outlet is listed in the phone directory.
2. Closing year: The last year in which a particular outlet is listed in the phone directory.
3. Location: The exact address of each outlet.
Outlets that rst appear in the 1970 phone books may have opened in earlier years. To in-
vestigate whether this cut-o¤ is appropriate, I look at the older phone directories (1950-1970) for
some cities. With the exception of a few A & W and Harveys outlets, very few in my sample ac-
tually opened before 1970. Each address is later geocoded and assigned a 6-digit postal code using
Geocoder.ca.27 For each relevant FSA, I identify whether or not a chain is active in a particular
FSA; a chain is dened to be active if it has at least one active store in the market.
Table 2 shows that each FSA can contain upwards of 9 outlets for a given chain. However,
the fast food chains typically operate either 0 or 1 outlet in each market. Fewer than 5% of my
market-time observations have a chain operating more than 1 outlet. Table 3 shows that both entry
and exit occur for most congurations. From this table, we see that exit is most likely to happen
in markets with 4 or 5 chains active in the period before, while entry is most likely to happen with
0, 3 or 4 chains active in the period before. Finally, the chains in general di¤er in terms of their
entry timing (Table 4). After tabulating the total number of markets each chain is a rst entrant
reveals that A & W and McDonalds typically enter rst. Burger King, Harveys, and Wendys are
more often than not followers into markets.
26This library has the most comprehensive collection of archived phone directories in Canada.
27 In the event that Geocoder.ca was unable to nd a postal code match corresponding to the desired address, I
used either Google Maps, online store locators on the chainswebsites, or inquired the chains directly by phone.
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Table 2: Tabulation of market-time observations that contain 0, 1, ..., 9 outlets belonging to each
of the chains. Note that these are not market structure congurations: each column should be read
(and interpreted) independent of another column.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
0 18,018 19,182 19,070 12,192 19,539
1 3,126 2,505 2,536 7,027 2,174
2 508 188 228 1,891 142
3 160 13 46 536 28
4 67 0 6 142 5
5 9 0 2 55 0
6 0 0 0 28 0
7 0 0 0 9 0
8 0 0 0 5 0
9 0 0 0 3 0
Table 3: Transition probabilities from X chains (row) to Y chains (column).
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 93.32 6.46 0.21 0.01 0 0
1 1.06 93.87 4.69 0.33 0.04 0
2 0 2.48 90.93 6.30 0.26 0.04
3 0 0.07 3.13 90.54 6.05 0.21
4 0 0 0 5.23 90.97 3.80
5 0 0 0 0 6.08 93.92
Table 4: Tabulation of the total number of markets that a chain was the (unique) rst entrant.
Chain First entrant
A & W 100
Burger King 50
Harveys 65
McDonalds 334
Wendys 34
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Figure 3: Evolution of Canadas fast food industry.
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3 Preliminary evidence on clustering and spillovers
3.1 Suggestive patterns28
We see from Figure 3 that the industry has experienced signicant growth over the past few
decades. This observation motivates me to look at what drives chain expansion. To measure
the growth rate of each chain i in market m, I calculate market level growth as Growthimt =
log(Totalimt+1 + 1)  log(Totalimt + 1), where t is a time index. This denition of the growth rate
allows for the fact that in many markets, Totalimt or Totalimt+1 may be equal to zero29. In this
specication, Totaljmt is equal to the total number of outlets that j has in market m at time t, and
Total_Otherjmt is the total number of outlets that j has in all other markets except m. Temporal
and geographic variation of this measure allows me to look at the following panel data VAR model:
Growthimt = i+Zmti+
X
8j
1ij log(Totaljmt+1)+
X
8j
2ij log(Total_Otherjmt+1)+m+"imt:
(1)
The coe¢ cient 1ii captures the usual relationship between rm growth and own size within
28The Canadian fast food industry exhibits a lot of agglomeration. When I calculate the Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) statistic using my data, the statistic, which lies between 0.01 to 0.08, is comparable to those pertaining to the
automobile and computer industry, both of which are quintessential examples of localized industries.
29 If for example, Totalimt = Totalimt+1 = 0, then Growthimt = 0.
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market m, while 1ij captures the rarely analyzed relationship between rm growth and the size of
others within marketm. The vector Zmt contains market specic information about the population,
population density, income, and property value for a given city and year.
From Table 5, I would like to rst point out that there is a negative relationship between rm
growth and own size for each of the chains. This nding is consistent with Kosová and Lafontaines
(2010) analysis of franchised chain growth. Their explanation for this negative correlation is each
chains convergence to some equilibrium size. They attribute the boundedness of size to the fact
that franchised chains often provide single products, which establishes a natural limit to "how much
of a single product a rm produces."
Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between rm growth and the past size of others (in
the same city): A & Ws growth is positively associated with the size of Burger King and Wendys;
Burger Kings growth is positively associated with Harveys and Wendys; McDonalds growth is
positively associated with the size of A & W; and Wendys growth is positively associated with the
size of all of its rivals. Note that as the tests for rst and second order serial correlation are unable
to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, the regression model is dynamically complete,
and hence establishes Granger causality.
I now focus on patterns in entry timing. To investigate this relationship, I exploit the fact that
my data contains a large amount of variation in terms of entry timing. The following regression is
run using data on years of entry:
Y earim = + Initialim + i + m + "im: (2)
where i 2Mi where Mi is the set of markets that experienced entry by chain i. Y earim denes the
year in which entry occurred for the observation, and Initialim is the number of active rivals in
1970. I also include a chain xed i and market xed e¤ect m to address concerns of unobserved
heterogeneity. Note that A & W entered 270 markets, Burger King entered 203 markets, Harveys
entered 232 markets, McDonalds entered 461 markets, and Wendys entered 182 markets, which
means that there is a total to 1348 instances of entry. The parameter  captures the suggestive
spillover e¤ect on entry timing. With my data, the total number of rival chains in 1970 ranges from
0 to 3. The regressions suggest that having a large number of rival chains is correlated with early
entry (Table 6).
Based on the observed patterns I have outlined in this section, one may conjecture the existence
of externalities between chains. In the next section, I provide empirical evidence that indeed this
may be the case.
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Table 5: Relationship between market expansion growth and chain size over time with FSA level
xed e¤ects. Estimation uses data at the chain-fsa-time level. Growth is calculated for each chain
as log(Totalimt+1+1) log(Totalimt+1). I use the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in panel
data for the 1st and 2nd order tests. This test statistic has an asymptotic Normal distribution. I
include the test statistic along with its corresponding p-value in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
log(A & W size same FSA) -0.110 0.00425 -0.00158 0.0145 0.0125
(0.00330) (0.00259) (0.00301) (0.00383) (0.00243)
log(Burger King size same FSA) 0.0130 -0.0968 0.00224 -0.00213 0.00584
(0.00416) (0.00326) (0.00378) (0.00483) (0.00305)
log(Harveys size same FSA) 0.00317 0.00618 -0.100 -0.00151 0.0109
(0.00371) (0.00291) (0.00338) (0.00431) (0.00273)
log(McDonalds size same FSA) 0.00325 0.00290 0.00413 -0.108 0.0118
(0.00277) (0.00217) (0.00252) (0.00322) (0.00203)
log(Wendys size same FSA) 0.0251 0.0104 0.00434 0.00746 -0.0882
(0.00441) (0.00346) (0.00401) (0.00512) (0.00324)
log(A & W size other FSA) -0.00265 -0.0391 0.0149 0.0120 -0.0113
(0.00752) (0.00591) (0.00685) (0.00873) (0.00553)
log(Burger King size other FSA) 0.00237 0.00440 0.00273 -0.0101 0.00178
(0.00252) (0.00198) (0.00229) (0.00292) (0.00185)
log(Harveys size other FSA) 0.00872 0.0127 0.0000182 0.0166 0.000544
(0.00324) (0.00254) (0.00295) (0.00376) (0.00238)
log(McDonalds size other FSA) -0.0121 0.0213 -0.0163 0.00580 0.0114
(0.00525) (0.00412) (0.00477) (0.00609) (0.00385)
log(Wendys size other FSA) 0.00140 -0.00524 0.00403 0.00157 -0.00199
(0.00255) (0.00200) (0.00232) (0.00296) (0.00187)
log(Population) -0.00120 -0.0297 -0.0107 0.00295 -0.00106
(0.0173) (0.0136) (0.0157) (0.0201) (0.0127)
log(Population density) 0.00347 0.0325 0.0104 0.00264 0.00336
(0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0168) (0.0214) (0.0136)
log(Income) 0.00417 -0.00395 -0.0171 0.000898 -0.00110
(0.00383) (0.00300) (0.00348) (0.00444) (0.00281)
log(Property value) 0.00106 0.000451 -0.00184 0.00334 -0.00108
(0.00289) (0.00227) (0.00263) (0.00335) (0.00212)
Proportion work in same FSA -0.0337 0.0290 0.0109 -0.0273 -0.0565
(0.0834) (0.0654) (0.0758) (0.0968) (0.0612)
Constant -0.00140 0.110 0.246 -0.146 0.0370
(0.0797) (0.0625) (0.0725) (0.0925) (0.0585)
Observations 20930 20930 20930 20930 20930
R2 0.0540 0.0452 0.0457 0.0545 0.0376
Test for 1st-order autocorrelation -0.62696 (0.5307) -1.9385 (0.0526) -0.78498 (0.4325) -0.8418 (0.3999) -1.3009 (0.1933)
Test for 2nd-order autocorrelation 0.70658 (0.4798) 0.91798 (0.3586) 0.33925 (0.7344) 0.9501 (0.3421) -0.11496 (0.9085)
Clustered standard errors (by FSA) in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 6: Patterns in the timing of entry. The dependent variable is the year in which a chain rst
entered a market.
(1) (2)
Year of entry Year of entry
Number of active rivals in 1970 -2.274 -1.679
(0.161) (0.377)
Burger King 1.974 3.520
(0.766) (1.145)
Harveys 3.142 2.654
(0.735) (1.043)
McDonalds -3.519 -1.492
(0.708) (0.906)
Wendys 3.101 3.405
(0.821) (1.157)
Number of active rivals in 1970 * Burger King -1.056
(0.557)
Number of active rivals in 1970 * Harveys 0.383
(0.537)
Number of active rivals in 1970 * McDonalds -1.669
(0.501)
Number of active rivals in 1970 * Wendys -0.270
(0.567)
Constant 1992.4 1991.6
(0.599) (0.724)
Observations 1348 1348
FSA xed e¤ects No Yes
R2 0.1787 0.1917
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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3.2 Empirical evidence of spillover e¤ects
The primary objective of this section is to establish the existence of spillover e¤ects (or learning)
using simple reduced form analysis. A main issue that we have to deal with in this section is
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of local markets so that we can be condent that our
estimates of learning/spillover e¤ects do not capture spuriously this market heterogeneity; this
main nding is important as empirical studies that have produced positive correlations between
entry decisions of seemingly rival entities have often blamed their "counter-intuitive" ndings on
unobserved heterogeneity.30 I now argue that unobserved heterogeneity is not the sole explanation.
My goal is to verify a positive relationship between rivalsincumbency statuses, and ones own
decision to enter/stay in a market. Establishing this relationship is akin to nding evidence of
state dependence. The di¤erence here is that not only your state, but also your rivalsstates may
matter. The model I wish to estimate for each fast food chain is thus
Pr(aimt = 1jamt 1;Zmt) = (i +Zmti +
X
j 6=i
ijajmt 1 + it+ m + & it  m) (3)
where aimt is a binary choice variable that equals 1 if chain i is active in marketm at time t, Zmt are
(time-varying) exogenous market characteristics, amt 1 = fajmt 1gj is the vector of past decisions,
and the set of parameters fijg captures state dependence e¤ects. In particular, each so-called
spillover e¤ect is represented by ij for all i 6= j; this is the e¤ect I am interested in identifying. The
time trend is captured by . For the time being, I remain agnostic as to the interpretation of spillover
so as to maintain generality. The main complication associated with estimating a model of this
sort is the unobserved heterogeneity, captured by m, and its interaction with time.
31 Unobserved
heterogeneity under the context of fast food competition may be interpreted as information that
fast food developers have that is omitted in my data. Some examples would be information they
obtain through proprietary market research companies or their own research teams. I estimate the
market xed e¤ects directly using my 35 annual observations for each of the 608 FSA markets.
Table 7 provides the rst set of evidence in favor of positive spillovers:32 A & Ws decision to be
active is positively a¤ected by Burger King and Wendys incumbency status; Burger Kings decision
to be active is positively a¤ected by McDonalds and Wendys incumbency status; Harveys decision
30For example, Dunne, Limek, Roberts, and Xu (2009) employ this argument to explain why they nd that the
number of competitors appear to increase variable prots.
31 I include this interaction as the unobserved heterogeneity may not be constant over 36 years.
32 I get similar results using the Wooldridge (2005) extension of the random e¤ects probit.
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Table 7: Evidence of spillover e¤ects in the chainsdecision to be active in market. The estimates
are obtained using the xed e¤ects probit estimator that includes time trends and interactions
between time and FSA dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
A & W incumbent 3.952 0.0712 0.0946 0.0541 0.305
(0.0709) (0.0897) (0.0894) (0.0875) (0.0910)
Burger King incumbent 0.363 4.443 0.247 0.214 0.0169
(0.0990) (0.119) (0.108) (0.137) (0.124)
Harveys incumbent 0.00462 0.186 4.231 -0.0241 0.294
(0.0939) (0.102) (0.0916) (0.122) (0.109)
McDonalds incumbent 0.0614 0.181 0.364 4.621 0.481
(0.0715) (0.0817) (0.0745) (0.328) (0.0841)
Wendys incumbent 0.385 0.273 0.0558 0.0851 4.617
(0.102) (0.114) (0.109) (0.168) (0.137)
A & W age -0.0218 0.0134 -0.0155 0.0253 0.00338
(0.00551) (0.00652) (0.00676) (0.00695) (0.00695)
Burger King age -0.0130 -0.0438 -0.00280 -0.00952 0.0263
(0.00907) (0.00996) (0.00943) (0.0153) (0.00991)
Harveys age 0.0179 0.00462 -0.0432 0.0151 -0.00875
(0.00817) (0.00882) (0.00798) (0.0114) (0.0105)
McDonalds age 0.00392 0.00783 0.00539 0.106 0.00252
(0.00440) (0.00477) (0.00457) (0.0832) (0.00509)
Wendys age -0.00866 -0.00539 0.00933 -0.0120 -0.0501
(0.00934) (0.0100) (0.00924) (0.0160) (0.0109)
log(Population) 0.00598 -0.0472 0.0667 0.0815 0.102
(0.0314) (0.0374) (0.0344) (0.0332) (0.0434)
log(Population density) 0.0123 0.0520 -0.0235 0.00725 -0.0438
(0.0173) (0.0220) (0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0214)
log(Income) -0.0871 -0.0368 -0.334 -0.211 -0.0778
(0.0849) (0.100) (0.0860) (0.0905) (0.105)
log(Property value) -0.149 -0.226 0.148 -0.000932 -0.0899
(0.0516) (0.0610) (0.0542) (0.0531) (0.0634)
University 0.187 -0.0218 -0.0884 0.0322 -0.0929
(0.0884) (0.117) (0.113) (0.105) (0.130)
Constant 0.100 0.696 -0.902 -0.652 -1.591
(0.903) (1.053) (0.898) (0.903) (1.146)
Observations 20930 20930 20930 20930 20930
BIC 3517.7 2538.3 3116.2 3795.2 2238.2
Clustered standard errors (by FSA) in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 8: Evidence of spillover e¤ects in the chainsdecision to enter a market. The estimates are
obtained using the xed e¤ects probit estimator that includes time trends and interactions between
time and FSA dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
A & W incumbent 0.0531 0.128 0.0532 0.333
(0.0996) (0.0999) (0.0880) (0.0983)
Burger King incumbent 0.287 0.168 0.214 -0.0711
(0.120) (0.126) (0.138) (0.144)
Harveys incumbent 0.0177 0.201 -0.0312 0.209
(0.112) (0.116) (0.123) (0.120)
McDonalds incumbent 0.0594 0.185 0.398 0.539
(0.0839) (0.0879) (0.0824) (0.0888)
Wendys incumbent 0.421 0.303 0.141 0.0800
(0.121) (0.127) (0.133) (0.170)
A & W age -0.0146 0.0152 -0.00664 0.0255 0.00305
(0.00862) (0.00733) (0.00735) (0.00698) (0.00767)
Burger King age -0.0202 -0.191 0.0155 -0.00935 0.0324
(0.0123) (0.0855) (0.0112) (0.0154) (0.0113)
Harveys age 0.0205 0.00384 -0.0315 0.0153 0.00146
(0.00964) (0.0104) (0.0160) (0.0115) (0.0116)
McDonalds age -0.000225 0.00883 0.00876 -0.149 0.00439
(0.00533) (0.00538) (0.00532) (0.234) (0.00549)
Wendys age -0.00278 -0.00157 -0.00692 -0.0119 -0.0629
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0237)
log(Population) 0.0185 -0.0472 0.0902 0.0853 0.0699
(0.0373) (0.0412) (0.0398) (0.0336) (0.0446)
log(Population density) 0.0240 0.0640 -0.0398 0.00800 -0.0435
(0.0202) (0.0251) (0.0215) (0.0173) (0.0230)
log(Income) -0.116 0.00121 -0.275 -0.207 -0.104
(0.103) (0.113) (0.102) (0.0912) (0.114)
log(Property value) -0.158 -0.201 0.147 0.00926 -0.0524
(0.0606) (0.0678) (0.0612) (0.0536) (0.0694)
University 0.176 0.0518 -0.0570 0.0274 -0.0965
(0.106) (0.129) (0.124) (0.105) (0.143)
Constant 0.284 -0.165 -1.729 -0.864 -1.484
(1.063) (1.164) (1.034) (0.912) (1.219)
Observations 17278 18432 18309 11819 18759
BIC 2647.1 2129.4 2422.1 3739.1 1928.7
Clustered standard errors (by FSA) in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 9: Average partial e¤ects of incumbency status on being active using coe¢ cients obtained
from xed e¤ects estimator that includes time trends and interaction between time and FSA dum-
mies. Column refers to i while row is for j. Therefore, item (i; j) refers to the e¤ect that js
past incumbency status has on is decision to be active. Below each chains name, I indicate their
average probability of being active.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
0.18 0.12 0.13 0.44 0.11
A & W incumbent 0.9436 0.0038 0.0051 0.0101 0.0165
Burger King incumbent 0.0555 0.9707 0.0212 0.0488 0.0001
Harveys incumbent -0.0020 0.0128 0.9594 -0.0098 0.0158
McDonalds incumbent 0.0043 0.0116 0.0269 0.8442 0.0234
Wendys incumbent 0.0521 0.0209 0.0019 0.0136 0.9754
Table 10: Average partial e¤ects of incumbency status on entering a new market using coe¢ cients
obtained from xed e¤ects estimator that includes time trends and interaction between time and
FSA dummies. Column refers to i while row is for j. Therefore, item (i; j) refers to the e¤ect that
js past incumbency status has on is decision to enter. Below each chains name, I indicate their
average probability of entering a market.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
A & W incumbent 0.0005 0.0019 0.0028 0.0057
Burger King incumbent 0.0101 0.0040 0.0171 -0.0009
Harveys incumbent 0.0001 0.0039 -0.0029 0.0027
McDonalds incumbent 0.0096 0.0032 0.0089 0.0081
Wendys incumbent 0.0146 0.0070 0.0026 0.0037
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to be active is positively a¤ected by Burger King and McDonalds incumbency status; and Wendys
decision to be active is positively a¤ected by A & W, Harveys and McDonalds incumbency status.
We get similar results if we use entry decisions in place of active statuses. From Table 8: A & Ws
decision to enter is positively a¤ected by Burger Kings incumbency status; Burger Kings decision
to enter is positively a¤ected by McDonalds and Wendys incumbency status; Harveys decision
to enter is positively a¤ected by McDonalds incumbency status; and Wendys decision to enter is
positively a¤ected by A & W and McDonalds incumbency status.
4 Model of entry/exit with learning
4.1 Basic setting
There are J chains, indexed by i 2 f1; :::; Jg. Time is discrete and indexed by t. Every period,
the chains have to decide at the same time (and independently), whether or not to be active in a
market m. Each chains objective is to maximize the discounted payo¤s
P1
s 
t+simt+s, where
imt+s is the one-shot payo¤ of rm i at period t + s, and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Let
aimt 2 f0; 1g indicate whether chain i is active (aimt = 1) or not active (aimt = 0) during time t.
Choosing not to be active at time t yields a one-shot payo¤ of zero. Being active in a market yields
imt(aimt = 1) = S

mt(1i  
X
j 6=i
2ijajmt)  FCi   (1  aimt 1)ECi   "imt: (4)
Market size is denoted by Smt = Zmt , where Zmt is a vector of exogenous market charac-
teristics.33 The parameter 1i captures a chain specic xed e¤ect for revenue; in other words,
how e¤ective a chain is at turning potential demand into realized sales, either through superior
brand recognition or advertising campaigns. Furthermore, an active rms variable prots depends
on whether its competitors are also active in the market, as captured by 2ij . As in Seim (2006),
each chain receives a privately known and idiosyncratic shock "imt, which is assumed to be from a
type I extreme value distribution. There are also entry and xed costs, denoted by ECi and FCi
respectively.
4.2 Information externality
Before describing the information structure in detail, I will illustrate the learning mechanism using
a simple example. Suppose that a fast food executive has to decide whether to enter a market that
33As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), I normalize the coe¢ cient in front of Populationmt to be 1, so that variable
prot is measured in population units.
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Figure 4: Timeline of decisions and information ows.
was recently pitched by a land developer. At his disposal are data on population, income, and the
like. Although this information is useful in assessing whether the prospective market has potential,
he is not entirely sure about his forecast about market size.34 While his forecast may be correct,
there is also a chance that he underestimates or overestimates the markets potential. If he decides
to enter the market, the uncertainty will be resolved; for example, the executive can observe that
stores revenue data after entry. Alternatively, he can hold back the investment, and update his
prior forecast using past exit/stay decisions of rivals. Because incumbent rivals who decide to stay
or exit base their decisions on the true market size, their decisions may in fact be informative to
outsiders. This intuition is summarized in Figure 4.
Although the true market size is Smt, each chains expectation of market size is based on the
true market size plus some uncertain component,
Smt = S

mt + !m: (5)
34My assumption that uncertainty is related to demand is largely motivated by Yangs (2010) study, along with
conversations with industry executives. As the strategic interaction parameters (ij) are determined by the substi-
tutability between products, one would expect fast food chains to be quite certain about how they compare with
their rivals.
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The term !m captures noise in their assessment of market size, which is unknown to the chains
initially. They however have common prior beliefs about !m, as characterized by the cumulative
distribution function H(!m), where
H(!m) =
8<:
0 if !m = 
1  0 if !m = 0
(6)
For simplicity, I assume that the distribution for prior beliefs has a two element support,35

 = f; 0g, and is characterized by the tuple (0; ). We see that with probability 0 the chain has
an incorrect assessment of market size and with probability 1  0, a chains assessment is correct.
This specication carries two main assumptions: stationarity of !m, and common (0; ) across
chains.
These assumptions do come with some caveats. It is possible that over time, prior beliefs
naturally become more precise; however, this feature will introduce nonstationarity to the dynamic
game, thereby complicating computation, identication, and estimation. The second assumption
rules out the possibility that certain rms may have more precise priors than others (i.e., 0 close to
zero for certain chains). Retail chains, such as McDonalds, are known to have superior real estate
research divisions. Alternatively, some chains may be able to learn from their own experiences in
similar markets. Relaxing this second assumption is not trivial, as we would have to allow the
beliefs regarding the distribution of !m to be private information; for example, McDonalds would
never share its real estate research with others. Therefore, we would need a rich enough model
to allow chains to not only infer the common market uncertainty from an incumbents exit/stay
decision, but also allow them to infer their rivals prior regarding the market. This complication
will also obfuscate our notion (and consequently identication) of learning from others, as potential
entrants could now learn from their rivals decisions to not enter particular markets. Although
these assumptions make potentially strong abstractions away from the true learning process, the
model I have specied is rich enough to capture heterogeneity in learning e¤ects (i.e., which rms
care about learning), while at the same time, is simple enough to establish identication.
Each chains belief about this risk may change over time through own learning and learning from
others. Let (mt; ) be chain is posterior belief at time t, where mt is the posterior probability
that the assessment is incorrect, and 1   mt is the posterior probability that the assessment is
correct.
35The two-point support I use is similar to one of the specications used by Chernew et al (2008) in their empirical
paper on learning and health plans. Note that such a specication of prior beliefs implicitly assumes that the prior
distribution for ! is stationary, and that prior beliefs are the same across rms.
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A fast food chain will learn the true market size upon entry, which takes place at the beginning
of a period t. By learning about the true market size, the incumbent chain i will have an unbiased
estimate of market size by the next period (t + 1), i.e. mt+1 = 0; consequently, its decision to
exit/stay at the beginning of t + 1 is made using this new information. At t + 2, a rival potential
entrant will observe the incumbents decision at t+1, and will try to infer a new set of beliefs based
on the observation. Therefore, own learning completely resolves the uncertainty in one period,
while learning from others takes two periods to take e¤ect. Consequently, i has no opportunity to
learn vicariously as a potential entrant if ajmt 2 = 0. However, if ajmt 2 = 1 for at least some j
such that, then a potential entrant can update its past beliefs using Bayes rule. First dene the
set of informed rivals as
Jmt = fk : akmt 2 = 1g: (7)
Each rm i knows that every rm in the set Jmt is aware of the true value of !m at period
t  1. Therefore, i knows that every rm in this set has the same value of mt, which is either 0 or
1. With this notation in place and using Bayes rule, a potential entrant can then update its beliefs
mt 1 using the following equation:
mt =
Pr(amt 1j = 1)mt 1
Pr(amt 1j = 1)mt 1 + Pr(aimt 1j = 0)(1  mt 1) : (8)
Given the assumption of independent private information shocks, the conditional probability
Pr(amt 1j = x) is dened as
Pr(amt 1j = x) =
Y
j2Jmt
Pjm()
ajmt 1  (1  Pjm())(1 ajmt 1) (9)
where Pjm() = Pr(ajmt = 1jmt = ). The probability Pr(amt 1jmt = x) captures the informa-
tion content associated with observed amt 1, which is a vector of actions at period t   1 of thse
rms that belong to the set Jmt. Ultimately, whether the rival incumbent has stayed or exited at
t  1 will a¤ect how the posterior is updated at t.
I now summarize the cases to be considered when updating the posterior beliefs (mt; ):
1. faimt 1 = 1g or faimt 1 = 0; mt 1 = 0g: True market size is known, so mt = 0. The second
condition ensures that a chain that learned the true market size will not forget.
2. faimt 1 = 0; mt 1 6= 0; Jmt = ?g: No new information to update posterior, so mt = 0.
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3. faimt 1 = 0; mt 1 6= 0; Jmt 6= ?g: Posterior belief mt is updated using the updating
equation above.
With this belief updating, all rms that have not entered will hold the same belief, and all
rms who have already entered will hold the same belief. Given the posterior beliefs mt, chain is
assessment of market size is
E(Smt) = mt(S

mt + ) + (1  mt)Smt (10)
= Smt + mt:
Referring back to my illustrative example with chains A and B, I will describe the evolution of
beliefs. At time t, chain A has entered and chain B has decided to stay out. When these chains made
their decisions at t, they both shared the same beliefs 0. Because chain A entered the market at
time t, its belief in the subsequent periods will be 0, as its uncertainty has been completely resolved.
Although chain B, at time t + 1, observes chain As past decision to enter, this past decision has
no informative value as the decision was not made when the uncertainty was resolved; therefore,
chain Bs beliefs do not change: mt+1 = 0. Chain B will update its posterior at time t+ 2, as it
observed chain As decision to stay or exit at time t+1 upon resolving its uncertainty. Consequently,
mt+2 = Pr(amt 1jmt 1 = 1)0=(Pr(aAmt 1jmt 1 = 1)0 + Pr(amt 1jmt 1 = 0)(1  0)).
4.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
The vector of payo¤ relevant state variables for rm is (Xmt; "imt). Here,
Xmt = famt 2;amt 1; mt 1;Zmtg (11)
where amt 2 = faimt 2gi, amt 1 = faimt 1gi, and Zmt are exogenous market characteristics.
An assumption I make regarding the equilibrium is that the strategy functions, f'i(Xmt; "imt)gi
depend on the state variables; hence, the equilibrium is Markov Perfect. Given this state, the
equilibrium strategies can be written as
'i(Xmt; "imt) = arg max
aimt2f0;1g
E ['imt +  V
'
i (Xmt+1; "imt+1) j Xmt; "imt] (12)
where V 'i (Xmt+1; "imt+1) is the Bellman equation dened as
V 'i (Xmt; "imt) = max
aimt2f0;1g
E ['imt +  V
'
i (Xmt+1; "imt+1) j Xmt; "imt] : (13)
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The one-shot payo¤s 'it are evaluated at strategy '. Integrating over the strategy function
gives us
Pi(Xmt) =
Z
i
'(Xmt; "imt)dGi("imt): (14)
With this notation in place, the per-period expected prots are written as
E('imt j Xmt; "imt) = aimt[Pi (Xmt)  "imt] (15)
where Pi (Xmt) is dened in terms of expected market size and integrated strategies,
Pi (Xmt)  (Smt + imt)
241i  X
j 6=i
2ijPj(Xmt)
35  FCi   (1  aimt 1)ECi: (16)
The expectation of the Bellman equation depends on the state vector, transition probability
vector36 FX;Pi (aimt;Xmt), and integrated value functions V
P
i
E(V 'i (aimt;Xmt+1; "imt+1)jXmt; "it)  FX;Pi (aimt;Xmt)0 V Pi : (17)
Here, each element of V Pi is integrated over the future private information,
V Pi (Xmt+1) 
Z
V 'i (Xmt+1; "it+1)dG("it+1): (18)
The best response function for rm i is now dened as
'i(Xmt; "it) =
8<: 1 if 
P
i (Xmt) + F
X;P
i (1;Xmt)
0 V Pi  FX;Pi (0;Xmt)0 V Pi + "imt
0 otherwise
(19)
Consequently, the best response functions will satisfy
Pi(Xmt) = Gi

Pi (Xmt) + [F
X;P
i (1;Xmt)  FX;Pi (0;Xmt)]0 V Pi

: (20)
4.4 Extension: Inclusion of demand externalities
The model presented thus far contains no demand externality. In this section, I describe an ex-
tension that will include this feature. An important assumption I make regarding the demand
assumption is that it operates through the market size component. Using a similar specication as
Toivanen and Waterson (2005), I let
36 I use the Tauchen (1986) to obtain the transition matrix for the discretized exogenous market characteristics.
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Simt = Zmt + i
X
j 6=i
ajmt 1 (21)
where i captures the e¤ect that a demand externality has on chain i. If i > 0, then the presence
of rivals can increase market size;37 such an e¤ect is possible if consumers benet from a larger
selection of brands or if chains located in close proximity benet from softened price competition.
Unlike the information externality, the rivals past presence alone will have a direct impact on the
market size, regardless of whether the rival was active or not at time period t  2.
5 Identication of information externalities
5.1 What is the source of uncertainty?
Uncertainty is an important pre-requisite of learning. I o¤er one possible interpretation about
uncertainty under the context of Canadas hamburger fast food industry. According to insight
gathered from numerous interviews with executives,38 the fast food industry faces considerable
uncertainty in demand, as they rarely know ex ante whether certain consumer segments will be
receptive to American style hamburgers. Consumers may vary in taste preferences, as dictated
by di¤erences in their cultural background. It is well known that in the 1970s, American style
hamburgers were not heavily marketed to markets outside of America (Love, 1995). Also note
that Canada has a lot of cultural diversity among its citizens; and as people of similar cultural
backgrounds tend to live in the same neighborhoods, much of the uncertainty these managers face
will be geographic in nature.
5.2 How is uncertainty resolved?
The main assumption used throughout my model is as follows: once a chain opens an outlet
in a particular market, the geographic risk associated with that market will be resolved. This
assumption is intuitive. General managers often have access to detailed revenue data from each
outlets sales; consequently, any demand risk they faced prior to store opening should eventually
be resolved upon entry. For this assumption to be valid, we need the demand risk to be stationary
over time; otherwise, the revenue information they obtained will not shed any light about the
uncertainty they face across markets. Manski (2004) makes a similar assumption where outcome
distributions exhibit stationarity.
37Similar externalities have been found in two-sided markets, where the number of sellers increases the probability
of potential sellers to enter (Tucker and Zhang, 2010).
38Refer to the Appendix for further details.
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Table 11: Example of payo¤s from being active for A & W as either uninformed potential entrant
or informed incumbent.
A & W
Potential entrant Incumbent
Stay A C
Burger King
Exit B D
Sequential learning requires the observation of past actions. Following Manski (2004), I assume
that fast food chains are aware of each markets set of incumbents when they make their entry/exit
decisions; a reasonable assumption as fast food outlets are clearly visible to all. Furthermore,
outlets are listed in yearly editions of phone directories and retail chain directories once they are
open for business.
Incumbent rivals who decide to stay or exit base their decisions on revealed information; con-
sequently, their decisions may be informative to uninformed potential entrants. While potential
entrants have an incentive to learn from others, informed incumbents do not. One will not nd such
an asymmetry between potential entrants and incumbents in their reaction to demand externalities
or unobserved heterogeneity.
To some extent, this identication strategy is inspired by past studies that use the following
logic: learning from others is more (less) pronounced for cases in which the prior is di¤use (precise).
For movie consumption, Moretti (2010) uses whether a movie is a sequel or not; Conley and Udry
(2010) use whether farmers are already familiar with a particular production process; Guiso and
Schivardi (2007) presume that large rms are more informed than small rms; and for Twitter
adoption, Chi and Yang (2010) use whether a politician has already adopted Facebook. All of
these examples use a precise prior as a placebo.
5.3 Simple example
I will now illustrate the identication strategy using a simple example. Let us focus on two chains,
say, A & W and Burger King. Suppose that we are interested in identifying the e¤ect that Burger
Kings information externality has on A & W. Note that A & W can either be an uninformed
potential entrant, or informed incumbent. Burger King either stayed or exited the market the year
before, and this decision would have implications on A & Ws payo¤s of being active as described
in Table 11.
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We see from the table that the di¤erence A - B is the di¤erence in payo¤s for A & W from
entering the market as a potential entrant in light of Burger Kings decision to stay as opposed to
exit, while the di¤erence C - D is the di¤erence in payo¤s for A & W from staying in the market as
an incumbent in light of Burger Kings decision to stay as opposed to exit. The rst di¤erence will
capture both learning and non-learning e¤ects, while the second di¤erence will only capture non-
learning e¤ects as A & W reacts to informational spillovers only as a potential entrant. Therefore,
the double-di¤erence (A - B) - (C - D) will help identify the information externalities. In other
words, if A & W is much more likely to enter as a potential entrant, than stay as an incumbent in
light of Burger Kings decision to stay as opposed to exit, then learning exists.
5.4 Double-di¤erence decomposition
I will now establish the conceptual framework behind the strategy for identifying learning e¤ects.
Suppose now that chain i can either be a potential entrant (aimt 1 = 0) or an incumbent (ajmt 1 =
1), while one if its rivals, j was an incumbent at time t   1 (ajmt 2 = 1); thus chain i observes
js past decision to stay (ajmt 1 = 1) or exit (ajmt 1 = 0). As an incumbent, js decision at t  1
was made without facing uncertainty. The main identication problem is to determine whether is
reaction to js stay/exit decision at t 1 is driven primarily by an information externality. To ensure
that i did not already have an opportunity to learn from its or otherspast decisions, the market in
question was never previously explored by i, j, or other chains prior to t  2 (fakmt s = 0gs>2;8k).
Dene V1(aimt 1; ajmt 1) as the value of being active in a market conditional on (aimt 1; ajmt 1),
and V0(aimt 1; ajmt 1) as the value of not being active in a market.39 There are unobservable
components to being active and inactive which I denote as "1 and "0. Therefore, conditional on its
own incumbency status, and the stay/exit decision of its rival, the probability that chain i is active
in a market can be dened as:
P (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = Pr(V1(aimt 1; ajmt 1) + "1 > V0(aimt 1; ajmt 1) + "0) (22)
= Pr(~" < ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1))
= F~"( ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1))
where ~" = "0  "1, ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = V1(aimt 1; ajmt 1) V0(aimt 1; ajmt 1), and F~"() is the cu-
mulative distribution function for the unobservable ~". Note that given a parametric assumption re-
39Market characteristics also enter the value of being active. For notational simplicity, I take as assumed that V1()
also depends on a vector of market characteristics Zmt.
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garding F~"(), and data on entry/exit decisions, ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) is identied semi-parametrically:
~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = F 1~" (P (aimt 1; ajmt 1)) (23)
If we assume that ~" has a U [0; 1] distribution, then ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = P (aimt 1; ajmt 1). Al-
ternatively, we can let ~" be a logit error, in which case ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = log(P (aimt 1; ajmt 1)=[1 
P (aimt 1; ajmt 1)]). With this notation in place, I place some additional structure on the identi-
able ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1). Here, I write ~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) as
~V (aimt 1; ajmt 1) = E( ~Rjaimt 1; ajmt 1): (24)
where E( ~Rjaimt 1; ajmt 1) is chain is expectation about the net benet of being active conditional
on its own incumbency status, as well as its rivals past decision to stay or exit.
The rst di¤erence in my double-di¤erence decomposition is dened by:
~V (0; 1)  ~V (0; 0) = E( ~Rj0; 1)  E( ~Rj0; 0): (25)
This object captures a potential entrants reaction to its rivals past decision to stay or exit.
Note that this di¤erence can potentially be non-zero for two reasons. First, a rivals past presence
could be indicative of either unobserved heterogeneity and/or demand externalities. Secondly, a
rivals past presence could a¤ect the potential entrants information set, as it still faces uncertainty.
In other words, this rst di¤erence will capture both learning and non-learning e¤ects induced by
js decision to stay as opposed to exit. The second di¤erence in my double-di¤erence decomposition
is dened by:
~V (1; 1)  ~V (1; 0) = E( ~Rj1; 1)  E( ~Rj1; 0): (26)
This object captures an incumbents reaction to its rivals past decision to stay or exit. Now, this
di¤erence can potentially be non-zero for only one reason, namely that a rivals past presence is
representative of either unobserved heterogeneity and/or demand externalities. Unlike a potential
entrant, an incumbents net benet of being active will only be a¤ected by non-learning factors
as it no longer faces uncertainty. Thus, this second di¤erence captures only non-learning e¤ects
induced by js decision to stay as opposed to exit. Subtracting the second di¤erence from the rst
di¤erence yields:
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Potential entrantz }| {
[ ~V (0; 1)  ~V (0; 0)] 
Incumbentz }| {
[ ~V (1; 1)  ~V (1; 0)] (27)
= f[E( ~Rj0; 1)  E( ~Rj0; 0)]  [E( ~Rj1; 1)  E( ~Rj1; 0)]g| {z }
Learning e¤ect
Therefore, taking the double-di¤erence will allow us to net out the non-learning e¤ects that
a¤ect both potential entrants and incumbents alike, and thus, isolate the learning e¤ect. Note
that the double-di¤erence will yield a lower bound if we allow for endogenous sunk costs (Sutton,
1991) and/or learning-by-doing. The argument for this assertion is that such features will make
the competition e¤ect associated with a rivals past presence more intense for potential entrants
relative to incumbents. As the fast food industry is advertising intensive, the past presence of
a rival can raise the cost of entry; this e¤ect works in the opposite direction as learning. With
learning-by-doing, an incumbent chain is more likely to compete with rivals as it will have moved
down its cost curve with experience, thereby allowing it to price competitively. If we fail to account
for these two cases, ~V (0; 1)  ~V (0; 0) will be biased downwards.
5.5 Implementation
I obtain the values of P (1; 1), P (1; 0), P (0; 1), and P (0; 0) for each chain-to-chain interaction using
either a simple probability frequency or logit estimator that conditions on a chains incumbency
status, its rivals incumbency status, and the observed market characteristics. For the frequency
estimator, I categorize all of the continuous market characteristics into 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 quartiles
so that each vector element in the support Z = fZmtg8m;t has a non-trivial probability of being
observed.
I will now go over the number of observations that satisfy each of the four main conditions,
namely the size of subsamples that satisfy aimt 1 = ai, ajmt 1 = aj , ajmt 2 = 1, and fakmt s =
0gs>2;8k for all (4 5) 22 = 80 possible combinations of chain-chain pairings. In general, we see
that the data provides the largest subsamples for identifying P (0; 1). In contrast, the subsamples
used to identify P (1; 1), P (1; 0) and P (0; 0) are smaller.40 There are disproportionately more
cases in which an incumbent stays, than exits; this feature explains why there are so many more
observations in the subsample for P (0; 1) in comparison to subsamples for P (1; 0) and P (0; 0). The
condition that no other chain had been active in the market makes the subsample for P (1; 1) much
40Subsample sizes used to estimate P (1; 1), P (1; 0), P (0; 1), and P (0; 0) for each chain-to-chain interaction are on
average around 40, 60, 200, and 15.
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Table 12: The role of information externalities obtained with the assumption that ~" is uniformly
distributed. Here, column pertains to chain i, and row pertains to is rival j. Note that the
information externality associated with McDonalds past stay/exit decisions is not identied as
their exit is virtually negligible. Below each chains name, I indicate their average probability of
being active.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
0.18 0.12 0.13 0.44 0.11
A & W 0.02 -0.14 0.02 0.01
Burger King 0.03 -0.18 0.01 0.01
Harveys 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
McDonalds N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wendys 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
smaller than the subsample for P (0; 1). If the decision making chain was active during the last
period, it is very likely it was also active in periods further back in time. Therefore, such a chain
would be removed from consideration when looking at the impact its rivals decision has on the
decision to stay/exit.
Also note that, there is virtually no exit for McDonalds, which precludes me from identifying
P^ (ai; aMCD) for all i 6=MCD. Therefore, the empirical strategy I have proposed does not allow me
to identify the information externalities coming fromMcDonalds past stay/exit decisions. However,
its decision to expand or not can be used to identify learning.41
5.6 Evidence of information externalities
My di¤erencing approach reveals that information externalities can explain the observed clustering
behavior we see in Canadas fast food industry. For my rst set of estimates, I assume that ~" has
a uniform distribution. Table 12 shows that for many chain-to-chain interactions, the information
externality has a positive impact on entry.42 In many cases, the information externality increases
the probability of being active by 2 percentage points. To evaluate the magnitude of this e¤ect,
note that a 1% increase in the population leads to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of
being active and that the unconditional probability of being active ranges from 10 to 44 percentage
points; therefore, this externality can have a real impact on most of the chains.
41 I exploit this data variation in a modied learning statistic proposed and implemented in the Appendix.
42The double-di¤erence decomposition I propose does not easily yield standard errors. However, in the Appendix, I
discuss an alternative approach that implements a exible logit with random xed e¤ects. The results are qualitatively
the same, and in some cases, statistically signicant at 10%, 5% or 1% levels. In particular, the results for A & W,
Burger King, and Harveys exhibit the least noise.
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Table 13: The role of demand externalities, competition e¤ects and unobserved heterogeneity
with the assumption that ~" is uniformly distributed. Here, column pertains to chain i, and row
pertains to is rival j. Note that the demand externalities, competition e¤ects and unobserved
heterogeneity associated with McDonalds past stay/exit decisions is not identied as their exit is
virtually negligible.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
0.18 0.12 0.13 0.44 0.11
A & W 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Burger King 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.01
Harveys 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
McDonalds N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wendys 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Heterogeneity in learning e¤ects may be consistent with a number of explanations. One possi-
bility is that some chains spend more on real estate research than others, which ultimately reects
varying preferences towards information (i.e., some chains value a reduction of uncertainty more
than others). Alternatively, managers may vary in skill across chains.43 This variance in skill
may imply that some managers have in depth knowledge about the markets they are responsible
for, while others have little knowledge. Those with little knowledge may have a stronger incen-
tive to take advantage of information externalities associated with the entry/exit decisions of more
experienced managers.
Table 13 shows that non-learning e¤ects have relatively smaller impact on chains, with the
exception of Harveys. In fact, these non-learning e¤ects are in fact quite large for Harveys. The
large e¤ects are generated by the observation that Harveys is much more likely to stay in a market
that is occupied by a rival, than in a market that is not occupied by a rival.44 There are two possible
explanations for this result. First, Harveys may be less e¢ cient at advertising and marketing, and
thus, face prohibitive entry barriers in light of rival presence. This explanation is consistent with
my earlier discussion about biases associated with asymmetric competition e¤ects among potential
entrants and incumbents. Alternatively, Harveys may simply be adopting a non-discretionary
approach towards choosing locations. If Harveys enters markets that are protable, as well as
markets that are not protable, then it should only survive in protable (and inherently popular)
markets.
43The relationship between manager skill and entry strategies has been well established by Goldfarb and Xiao
(2011) in their study about the US telephone industry.
44The nding that Harveys is less likely to exit under the presence of rival incumbents is reassuring in the sense
that the exit of Harveys is not simply the process of "making room" for American fast food chains.
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Table 14: The role of information externalities with the assumption that ~" is a logit error. Here,
column pertains to chain i, and row pertains to is rival j. Note that the information externali-
ties associated with McDonalds past stay/exit decisions is not identied as their exit is virtually
negligible.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
A & W 0.33 -0.19 -0.15 0.28
Burger King 0.25 0.14 -0.13 0.35
Harveys 0.14 0.41 0.11 0.15
McDonalds N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wendys 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.15
Table 15: The role of demand externalities, competition e¤ects and unobserved heterogeneity with
the assumption that ~" is a logit error. Here, column pertains to chain i, and row pertains to is
rival j. Note that the information externality associated with McDonalds past stay/exit decisions
is not identied as their exit is virtually negligible.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
A & W -0.32 -0.07 0.16 0.64
Burger King 0.02 0.27 -0.13 0.98
Harveys -0.77 0.41 0.43 0.1
McDonalds N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wendys 1.26 -0.25 0.61 0.15
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Similar results hold if I instead assume that ~" is a logit error, as I still nd evidence of learning
for a number of rms (Table 14). In general, the learning spillovers in most cases outweighs the
non-learning spillovers. Except now, the learning e¤ect is less pronounced for McDonalds. As
before, I still nd that non-learning e¤ects outweigh learning e¤ects for Harveys (Table 15).
6 Estimation of structural model
6.1 Identication of structural model
The model I have presented is nested within the class of stationary dynamic games with private
information that is additively separable. Furthermore, the model incorporates an exclusion restric-
tion, in which a chains incumbency status directly enters its own one-shot payo¤ via the entry
cost, and only a¤ects the rival chains indirectly through the learning mechanism. Taken together,
these assumptions along with rich variation in entry/exit decisions over a long time period ensure
that the proposed model is identied.45
As my data does not contain revenue, variable prots are identied using time-varying market
characteristics,46 as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). These market characteristics are the same ones
used in my earlier reduced form analysis. The evolution of population, income and property value
helps me identify the transition probabilities of exogenous characteristics.
Although I have established a clear and comprehensive identication strategy for the overall
learning e¤ect, the identication argument for the specic parametrization of uncertainty in my
model is a bit more subtle. That said, I will briey outline the type of variation in data needed in
order to separately identify (0; ). Note that the posterior beliefs can be written as
mt = f
P(Xmt) + g
P(Xmt)  0 (28)
where fP(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) are functions of the state variables and conditional choice probabil-
ities. Consequently, the assessment of market size is
E(Smt) = S

mt + f
P(Xmt)   + gP(Xmt)  0  : (29)
The parameter  can be identied provided that fP(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) are not collinear with
Smt. However, this parameter needs to be separately identied from 0. Therefore, one can separate
these two parameters if fP(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) are not collinear. Intuitively, we see that the degree
45Refer to Blevins (2010) for a detailed sumary of identication conditions.
46Refer to Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for analysis showing population as a key driver of market structure.
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of uncertainty () appears in a chains expected payo¤ provided that its uncertainty has not yet
been resolved, and has posterior beliefs mt 6= 0. Identifying  demands less out of the data, as
we only need variation among those that are not incumbents. The parameter 0 appears in the
payo¤ only when a potential entrant has not yet updated its beliefs about the market size; that
is, I need enough observations for which potential entrants make decisions whether to enter virgin
markets. Therefore, 0 will most likely appear in the expected payo¤ during the early years in
which potential entrants are naive. This observation reiterates the importance of having data that
dates back to an industrys initial stages.
In the model that contains both information and demand externalities, separate identication
of the parameters associated with uncertainty and i require even richer variation in the data. To
guide my identication argument, I write out the expected market size as
E(Smt) = Zmt + i
X
j 6=i
ajmt 1 + fP(Xmt)   + gP(Xmt)  0  : (30)
In particular, we need
P
j 6=i ajmt 1, f
P(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) to not be collinear. There are two
features that help with identication. First, variation in fP(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) depends heavily
on how di¤erently potential entrants and incumbents react to a rivals decision to stay or exit,
while variation in
P
j 6=i ajmt 1 is simply determined by each rivals incumbency status. Second,
the Bayesian learning process distinguishes fP(Xmt) and gP(Xmt) from
P
j 6=i ajmt 1 via functional
form.
6.2 Modied NPL procedure
The parameters in my model are  = fFCi; ECi; 1i; 2ij ; ; g8i and 0. Before estimation, I rst
map the structural parameters in the one-shot payo¤ into reduced form parameters,  = h().
This mapping amounts to expanding out the terms in the expected prots. Therefore, conditional
on Xmt and  = f;0g, the best response probability function Gi() is used to construct the
pseudo-likelihood equation,
Q(;P ) =
X
i;m;t
faimt logGi(P i(Xmt);Xmtj)+(1 aimt) log[1 Gi(P i(Xmt);Xmtj)]g: (31)
This pseudo-likelihood is highly nonlinear in the prior probability 0. Therefore, I consider an
algorithm that essentially concentrates out , and then searches for 0 over a grid space. The algo-
rithm is an extension of the Nested Pseudo Likelihood method originally designed by Aguirregabiria
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and Mira (2007).47 I base my method on the NPL as it does not require accurate non-parametric
estimates for the initial CCPs P 0 for consistency, while at the same time, being computationally
tractable. Moreover, the NPL estimates are more e¢ cient than alternative two-step methods.48
The modied NPL algorithm can be described as follows:
1. Generate a grid of possible values for (g)0 2 [0; 0:01; 0:02; :::; 0:99; 1].
2. Estimate non-parametrically the initial CCP vector P^
0;(g)
.
3. GivenXmt, P^
0;(g)
, and (g)0 , generate a sequence of posterior beliefs for each rm and market
f^0;(g)mt g8m;t.
4. Given Xmt, P^
0;(g)
, (g)0 , and f^
0;(g)
mt g8m;t, nd
^0;(g) = argmax

Q(f;(g)0 g; P^
0;(g)jXmt; f^0;(g)imt g8i;m;t): (32)
5. Update P^
0;(g)
using P^
1;(g)
= fGi(P^ 0;(g) i (Xmt);XmtjXmt; ^0;(g); (g)0 ; f^
0;(g)
mt g8m;t)g8m;t:
6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until
P^ k+1;(g)   P^ k;(g) is close to zero,49 where k is equal to the number
of iterations. Once convergence is reach, we have P^
NPL;(g)
and ^NPL;(g).
7. Obtain the structural parameters ^NPL;(g) using the minimum distance estimator:
^NPL;(g) = argmin

(^NPL;(g)   h())0Avar(^NPL;(g)) 1(^NPL;(g)   h()): (33)
8. Do steps 2 to 7 for each possible value for (g)0 , and then choose 
(g)
0 and ^
NPL;(g) that has
the highest pseudo-likelihood function.
When generating the sequence of posterior beliefs in Step 3, I face a complication. In the
model, Bayesian updating uses each incumbent rivals CCP conditional on either mt 1 = 0 or
mt 1 = 1. However, observing an incumbent rival that was already active at t  2 with incorrect
beliefs (mt 1 = 1) is purely counterfactual. I address this issue by conditioning the rival choice
probabilities on the observable data and whether the rival is a potential entrant or incumbent. An
uninformed rivals decision to enter or stay out can give us Pjmt 1(mt 1 = 1), and an informed
rivals decision to stay or exit can give us Pjmt 1(mt 1 = 0). Ultimately, variation in market size
can help identify these two measures.
47This estimation approach has been used in a variety of applications. Some examples include Aguirregabiria
(2004), Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009), Ellickson and Misra (2008), Han and Hong (2008), Lenzo (2010), Magesan
(2010), Sweeting and Roberts (2010), Walrath (2008), and Yang (2010).
48Refer to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for a comprehensive description of alternative methods.
49 I dene the tolerance level to be 10 8 for convergence in both the NPL and likelihood maximization procedures.
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7 Results
7.1 Summary of structural estimates
My structural estimates50 are summarized in Table 16. The coe¢ cients for the market character-
istics are of similar signs as those in my reduced form analysis. As in the previous section, retail
activity and the proportion of those working in the same FSA have positive e¤ects on the expected
payo¤, while income, population and property value have negative e¤ects. There is also some het-
erogeneity in terms of each chains cost structure. For instance, A & W and Wendys have the
largest xed costs, while McDonalds has the highest entry cost. McDonalds high entry cost could
be driven by a multitude of reasons. First, part of this cost could be a result of their extensive real
estate research during pro forma analysis of prospective locations. Alternatively, their outlets may
be the most expensive to build and/or make heavily advertised debuts. Similar to Toivanen and
Waterson (2005) and Vitorino (2008), my estimates for strategic interaction suggest a potential for
complementarity between chains, as the presence of a rival increases the expected payo¤. Therefore,
demand externalities may play a role in the overall spillover e¤ect.
Most importantly, I nd that chains face uncertainty. There is a signicant probability that their
ex ante assessments are wrong; and the extent to which they are wrong is also large. A positive
sign for the degree of uncertainty () also suggests that ex ante, chains are overly optimistic.
Therefore, the benet of learning would be to avoid seemingly protable markets that are in fact,
not protable. As uncertainty is a prerequisite for learning, these results provide indirect evidence
of learning. This nding in itself is a contribution to the study of spillover e¤ects in retail, as the
status quo has largely produced reduced form estimates of these e¤ects.
Figure 5 illustrates that the posterior beliefs converge towards ^mt = 0 over time. Potential
entrants are learning about the markets vicariously through the observed exit/stay decisions of
their rivals. With the inferred posterior beliefs, I can look at how they change over time. What
I am interested in is how the variation of these beliefs change over time. The same gure shows
that variation in ^mt for potential entrants initially increases, and then falls over time. In the very
beginning, chains beginning with the same common prior across all markets they are uncertain
about. As they learn about markets through learning from others, the beliefs across markets begin
to diverge. There will be few markets for which ^mt > 0 in the latter years because of learning.
50To initiate the portion of my algorithm that uses the NPL, I not only consider a nonparametric estimate of the
equilibrium probabilities, but also random draws of these probabilities. By initializing the NPL at di¤erent starting
points, I can check that the estimation procedure yields unique NPL xed points. I nd that my estimates are the
same regardless of the initialization. In general, less than 10 NPL iterations are needed for convergence; so much of
the computational cost was associated with the fact that I have to do a separate grid search for 0.
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Table 16: Structural estimation of entry model with information externalities. Note that the
discount factor is calibrated at  = 0:95. Signicance at 5% level denoted by *, and signicance at
1% level denoted by **.
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Market characteristics Strategic interaction
Proportion in same FSA 5.1851** (0.0042) A & W vs Burger King -0.0370** (0.0006)
Income -2.6288** (0.0055) A & W vs Harveys -0.0045 (0.0221)
Total sales 1.6260** (0.0055) A & W vs McDonalds 0.0075 (0.0055)
Total locations 0.4853** (0.0036) A & W vs Wendys -0.0340** (0.0086)
Population density -0.2855** (0.0229) Burger King vs A & W -0.0238** (0.0010)
Property value -0.3827** (0.0031) Burger King vs Harveys -0.0232* (0.0116)
Fixed costs Burger King vs McDonalds -0.0342* (0.0134)
A & W 1.1760** (0.0149) Burger King vs Wendys -0.0240* (0.0143)
Burger King 0.9602** (0.0088) Harveys vs A & W 0.0235 (0.0185)
Harveys 0.7942** (0.0091) Harveys vs Burger King -0.0236** (0.0072)
McDonalds -1.1391** (0.0049) Harveys vs McDonalds -0.0237 (0.0122)
Wendys 1.4675** (0.0120) Harveys vs Wendys -0.0194** (0.0025)
Entry costs McDonalds vs A & W -0.0088 (0.0168)
A & W 4.5577** (0.0371) McDonalds vs Burger King -0.0112 (0.0139)
Burger King 4.9283** (0.0009) McDonalds vs Harveys 0.0148** (0.0062)
Harveys 4.4807** (0.0002) McDonalds vs Wendys 0.0165 (0.0100)
McDonalds 5.9324** (0.0056) Wendys vs A & W -0.0322* (0.0154)
Wendys 5.3298** (0.0054) Wendys vs Burger King -0.0138 (0.0203)
Uncertainty Wendys vs Harveys -0.0350** (0.0077)
 0.3974** (0.0021) Wendys vs McDonalds -0.0530* (0.0231)
0 0.89** (0.0010) 1AW 0.1171** (0.0054)
1BK 0.0742** (0.0286)
1HARV 0.0562** (0.0145)
LL = -7572.9 1MCD 0.1269** (0.0171)
N = 20930 1WEND 0.1135** (0.0239)
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Figure 5: Evolution of estimated posterior beliefs (^mt) over time.
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This result is interesting, as it conrms the importance of having data on industry dynamics from
the early to mid years.
The structural estimates for the model that includes both information and demand externalities
appear in Table 17. Even when demand externalities are explicitly included to the model, the
parameters associated with uncertainty experience little change. The estimates associated with the
demand externalities are worth noting. Demand externalities appear to a¤ect each rm di¤erently.
In particular, the demand externality has the largest impact on Wendys, and smallest impact on
McDonalds.
7.2 Implications of uncertainty
The estimated structural model provides us an opportunity to learn more about the role of uncer-
tainty in two aspects: market structure and protability. To investigate the impact of uncertainty on
market outcomes, I compare the market structure or protability associated with the counterfactual
scenario with no uncertainty and the actual scenario with uncertainty. The counterfactual scenario
is implemented by setting  = 0 so as to calculate counterfactual probabilities using the method
proposed by Aguirregabiria (2009). These counterfactual probabilities are then used to generate a
new sequence of entry/exit decisions for each market under the scenario of no uncertainty.
7.2.1 On market structure
The objective of this analysis is to establish a link between uncertainty, learning, and market
power. Canadas fast food industry has become increasingly competitive over time (Figure 2), and
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Table 17: Structural estimation of entry model with information and demand externalities. Note
that the discount factor is calibrated at  = 0:95. Signicance at 5% level denoted by *, and
signicance at 1% level denoted by **.
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Market characteristics Strategic interaction
Proportion in same FSA 5.3668** (0.0100) A & W vs Burger King -0.0185 (0.0112)
Income -1.2428** (0.0177) A & W vs Harveys 0.0014 (0.0082)
Total sales 1.4977** (0.0029) A & W vs McDonalds 0.0087** (0.0013)
Total locations 0.9987** (0.0157) A & W vs Wendys -0.0168** (0.0018)
Population density -0.2806** (0.0300) Burger King vs A & W -0.0095* (0.0047)
Property value -0.9005** (0.0050) Burger King vs Harveys -0.0097 (0.0133)
Fixed costs Burger King vs McDonalds -0.0140 (0.0293)
A & W 2.0696** (0.0056) Burger King vs Wendys -0.0119 (0.0115)
Burger King 1.3514** (0.0010) Harveys vs A & W 0.0163 (0.0136)
Harveys 1.1402** (0.0018) Harveys vs Burger King -0.0124 (0.0149)
McDonalds -0.7722** (0.0058) Harveys vs McDonalds -0.0115 (0.0129)
Wendys 2.1772** (0.0011) Harveys vs Wendys -0.0110 (0.0382)
Entry costs McDonalds vs A & W -0.0059 (0.0426)
A & W 4.9976** (0.0261) McDonalds vs Burger King -0.0057* (0.0013)
Burger King 5.1038** (0.0147) McDonalds vs Harveys 0.0096* (0.0033)
Harveys 4.6499** (0.0056) McDonalds vs Wendys 0.0093* (0.0045)
McDonalds 6.2685** (0.0039) Wendys vs A & W -0.0078* (0.0028)
Wendys 5.7113** (0.0059) Wendys vs Burger King 0.0007 (0.0163)
Uncertainty Wendys vs Harveys -0.0089 (0.0071)
 0.6532** (0.0033) Wendys vs McDonalds -0.0184** (0.0005)
0 0.97** (0.0021) 1AW 0.1297** (0.0025)
Demand externality 1BK 0.0711** (0.0076)
A & Ws benet 0.5189** (0.0052) 1HARV 0.0570** (0.0094)
Burger Kings benet 1.1230** (0.0041) 1MCD 0.1067** (0.0262)
Harveys benet 0.5118** (0.0032) 1WEND 0.1177** (0.0004)
McDonalds benet -0.0196** (0.0010) LL = -7578.7
Wendys benet 1.9699** (0.0021) N = 20930
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Figure 6: The ratio between the total number of markets with one rm and the total number of
markets with more than one rm.
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this analysis will inform us to what extent uncertainty and learning contribute to this phenomenon.
I compare the actual market structure ( 6= 0) with the counterfactual market structure ( = 0)
over time. To make this comparison, I compare the competitiveness for each regime using the
following ratio:
# Monopoly Markets
# Oligopoly Markets
: (34)
Figure 6 plots the di¤erence between the ratio associated with an industry with uncertainty,
and the ratio associated with an industry without uncertainty. During the rst 20 years, the
ratio is larger under the actual scenario with uncertainty than the counterfactual scenario without
uncertainty; in other words, an industry with uncertainty is less competitive than an industry with
certainty initially. However, the ratio associated with uncertainty converges to the ratio associated
without uncertainty during the latter years. This pattern is consistent with the idea of learning
from the actions of competitors: uncertainty may be an entry barrier initially, but the observation
of successful incumbents encourage new entry in the latter years, which ultimately leads to greater
increases in the number of competitors for each market (with active incumbents) and convergence
towards a competitive outcome.
7.2.2 On entry and exit
Firms may be motivated to learn from the past decisions of rivals if doing so allows them to avoid
markets that are most likely to be unprotable. I explore this motivation in greater detail, and
investigate whether entry and exit are more prevalent when uncertainty is present. If rms face
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Table 18: Measure of excessive entry/exit under uncertainty.
1970 - 1990 1990 - 2005
Entry 3.7% 2.8%
Exit 7% 6.5%
uncertainty, they may be more prone to making incorrect assessments about market size, ultimately
leading to excessive entry into ex post sub-optimal markets. Upon revelation of the true market
size, they may wish to exit, especially when their forecasts were overly optimistic. I make the
comparison between exit rates with and without uncertainty by using the following metric:
E(NUncertainty)  E(NCertainty)
E(NCertainty)
: (35)
Here, E(NUncertainty) is the average number of chains that enter/exit when they face uncer-
tainty, and E(NCertainty) is the average number of chains that enter/exit when they do not face
uncertainty. Therefore, this quantity captures how much more entry/exit there may be in light of
uncertainty. I calculate this quantity separately for the initial years (1970 to 1990), and the latter
years (1990 to 2005).
Table 18 shows us that when an industry exhibits uncertainty, chains enter markets excessively
and are much more likely to exit. Furthermore, the disproportionate amount of entry/exit under
uncertainty is more pronounced during the early years (1970 to 1990). This pattern reects the
idea that uncertainty plays a greater role initially, as rms have fewer opportunities to learn from
others before making their entry decisions; thus, their decisions to enter are more likely to be based
on incorrect assessments about market size, ultimately resulting in ex post failure. To summarize,
there are many instances in which chains enter markets that they would have avoided ex post had
they known the true market size, and such cases are less prevalent over time as rms are able to
make inferences about the uncertain market size via learning.
7.2.3 On protability
As I have shown in the Appendix, the statistic for learning is large only to those that face uncer-
tainty. Given this relationship between the degree of uncertainty and my measure of learning, a
natural question would be whether rms value a reduction in uncertainty; that is, does ex ante
uncertainty act like an entry barrier? Furthermore, is there a close correspondence between the
value they place towards certainty and their reaction to information externalities?
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Figure 7: The value associated with uncertainty reduction over time.
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Table 19: Value of information as a proportion of monopolists value in a local market of median
size.
Chain Proportion
A & W 4.6%
Burger King 3.3%
Harveys 2.3%
McDonalds 2.3%
Wendys 4.8%
Notice that the premium rms place on certainty is in general larger than their entry costs
(Figure 7). Indeed, ex ante uncertainty can act as a signicant entry barrier since rms would
be better o¤ without it. In fact, the premium they place on certainty constitutes a non-negligible
portion of the net present values associated with being a monopolist (Table 18). Some noticeable
patterns emerge over time. The rst pattern is that the value associated with uncertainty reduction
decreases for all of the chains over time. Chains in general become more knowledgeable about the
markets with time; therefore, uncertainty is less of an entry barrier over time. The second pattern
to note is that these values converge over time; in other words, chains have heterogeneous attitudes
towards the value of uncertainty reduction in the early years. Finally, the results conrm that
indeed chains value the reduction of uncertainty di¤erently, and that Harveys places the least
value on certainty. It is well known among industry experts and academics that fast food chains
invest a lot into real estate research, some more than others. The benets associated with reducing
uncertainty may indeed justify the costs associated with pre-entry real estate research.
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Table 20: Relationship between the value of uncertainty reduction and market characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
log(Income) 0.00272 0.00228 0.00125 0.000155 0.00300
(0.000636) (0.000323) (0.000211) (0.000422) (0.000467)
log(Population) 0.0118 0.00589 0.00443 -0.00229 0.00468
(0.00253) (0.00110) (0.000699) (0.00102) (0.00162)
log(Property value) 0.00488 0.00144 -0.000914 0.00185 0.00320
(0.000458) (0.000246) (0.000169) (0.000307) (0.000347)
log(Population density) -0.0176 -0.00897 -0.00639 0.00138 -0.00852
(0.00271) (0.00118) (0.000749) (0.00111) (0.00175)
Proportion work in same FSA -0.0217 -0.0181 -0.00941 0.0122 -0.0264
(0.0119) (0.00650) (0.00399) (0.00652) (0.00940)
Own outlets in same city -0.000101 -0.0000582 -0.0000216 -0.00000980 -0.000128
(0.00000164) (0.00000104) (0.000000542) (0.000000275) (0.00000207)
Constant -0.0402 -0.0141 0.0115 -0.00168 -0.0239
(0.0115) (0.00605) (0.00396) (0.00665) (0.00867)
Observations 16464 18341 18182 12019 18889
R2 0.2633 0.2215 0.1338 0.1328 0.2388
Clustered standard errors (by FSA) in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
7.2.4 Managerial implications: Geographic variation in the certainty premium
There is variation across markets in the value associated with uncertainty reduction. To what extent
is this variation related to di¤erences in characteristics across markets? Markets for which this value
is high will also be markets where learning is most relevant. Therefore, linking the characteristics
with these premiums will help us identify markets that are most conducive to learning. I investigate
these patterns by running the following xed e¤ects regression:
V alueimt = i +Zmti + i  Existingimt + m + "imt: (36)
Here, V alueimt is the change in variable prots associated with a counterfactual reduction of
uncertainty to chain i (as a potential entrant) in market m at time t and Existingimt is equal to
the total number of existing outlets chain i has in neighboring markets within the same city. As in
the previous regressions, Zmt are exogenous market characteristics.
My results in Table 19 show that for all of the chains, markets with large populations, high
incomes, and valuable real estate are associated with large benets from uncertainty reduction. In
contrast, population density and the proportion of those working in the same FSA have a negative
relationship with this counterfactual quantity. High density areas where workers do not commute
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very far to work are often associated with metropolitan cities. Fast food managers may be more well
acquainted with metropolitan cities that receive more exposure in the international community;
as such, their familiarity with these areas precludes the need to obtain/learn new information.
Interestingly, this correlation is not pronounced for McDonalds. A natural conjecture is that as a
leader in real estate research, McDonalds should not value uncertainty reduction any more or less
in metropolitan areas as their research e¤orts overcome any informational disadvantage associated
with less developed areas. Taken together, these results suggest that learning will have the least
value in metropolitan areas.
There is also a geographic aspect associated with the value of uncertainty reduction, as this value
decreases as the number of existing neighboring outlets within the same city increases. Although
my model does not account for this feature, there could be spatial correlation in market risk. With
this correlation in place, a chain may already be well-informed about a particular market if it has
operated outlets in nearby markets. This nding motivates a richer model with spatially correlated
learning, to be pursued in future work. Nevertheless, this spatial autocorrelation does not lead me
to overstate the identied learning e¤ects, as these e¤ects of interest will simply be larger once I
control for this correlation.
Characteristics unrelated to market risk may also be spatially correlated. FSAs in large
metropolitan cities may enjoy certain benets associated with cost and managerial e¢ ciencies,
as well as demand ows from neighboring FSAs. In other words, unobserved heterogeneity may be
most prevalent in large cities, and thus lead me to overstate the benets of reducing uncertainty in
FSAs associated with those cities. Although addressing this concern directly is beyond the scope
of this paper, the negative correlation between the value of uncertainty reduction and population
density demonstrates that the counterfactual values associated with uncertainty reduction are not
disproportionately higher for FSAs in densely populated areas.
8 Conclusion
The primary objective of my paper has been to identify the driving force behind clustering of retail
chains, a challenging problem that current research in industrial organization, marketing, and
urban economics has not yet explored. Using unique data with rich time and geographic variation
from Canadas fast food industry, decomposition of the spillover e¤ect using a simple di¤erencing
technique reveals that information externalities can indeed explain the observed clustering of retail
chains. Structural estimation conrms that ex ante uncertainty matters, and counterfactual analysis
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conrms that it behaves like an entry barrier, especially during the industrys early years. In
particular, an industry with uncertainty is less competitive than an industry with certainty initially,
but becomes just as competitive over time. I also demonstrate that an industry with uncertainty will
have excessive entry/exit as the chains enter markets they would have avoided had they known the
true market size. This nding suggests the importance of information - estimates of the premium
these chains place on certainty indicates that the value of information constitutes a non-negligible
portion of their overall values. Ultimately, my research advances our collective knowledge about
the role and implications of learning in the retail industry.
In future work, I plan to explore the possibility that rms learn about protability through their
own experience in similar or neighboring markets. While the current paper models learning from
others, it may be worthwhile trying to separately (or simultaneously) model intra-rm learning.
Furthermore, variation in the level of experience in similar markets can introduce heterogeneity in
the prior beliefs, which can ultimately be identied by data.
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9 Appendix: Data
9.1 List of CMAs in sample by province
All CMAs contain an urban core, which has a population of at least 100,000. Once an area has been
designated as a CMA, its status will not change even if its population falls below the threshold. The
set of CMAs is quite representative of Canadas urban population, as nearly all of the provinces
are represented. However, because a large proportion of Canadians reside in Ontario, my sample
contains a disproportionately large number of CMAs from that province.
1. Alberta: Calgary, Edmonton.
2. British Columbia: Vancouver, Victoria, Kelowna, Abbotsford.
3. Manitoba: Winnipeg.
4. New Brunswick: Moncton, Saint John.
5. Newfoundland: St. Johns.
6. Nova Scotia: Halifax.
7. Ontario: Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, London, Windsor, Niagra Falls, Kingston, Peterbor-
ough, Guelph, Kitchener, Oshawa, Barrie, Brantford, Sudbury, Thunder Bay.
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8. Quebec: Montreal, Quebec City, Sherbrooke (Missing), Saguenay (Missing), Trois-Riveres
(Missing).
9. Saskatchewan: Saskatoon, Regina.
9.2 Summary of interviews with fast food executives51
A typical sequence of events that lead to a store opening is as follows: 1) A land developer will pitch
a location to the chain; 2) a research associate assigned to the geographic region associated with
the location in question will then conduct research for that market, and come up with a revenue
forecast and assessment for that prospective market; and nally, 3) the head of development in
that city will then give the nal approval. When deciding whether to approve a location or not,
they consider very carefully that locations population, number of daytime employees, and nearby
shopping centres and retailers. Surprisingly, the markets average income does not seem to play a
large role in McDonalds entry decisions.
At least with McDonalds, there appears to be geographic specialization within its real estate
teams. For example, one employee may be in charge of location decisions for a subregion of Toronto.
For both chains, market research prior to entry is important. Researchers are well acquainted with
population, income and demographic data. They also pay attention to (pedestrian) tra¢ c ows.
As Mr. White indicated, a researcher may take note of which direction pedestrians typically walk
to work, and which direction pedestrians typically come back home from work. These patterns will
a¤ect their entry decisions depending on how important they view the breakfast and lunch/dinner
markets. A strategy unique to Wendys is to send researchers to an existing rivals outlet to count
the number of patrons that walk into the store. This number will give them a rough idea about
the demand. While each chain views one another as a competitor, they will typically enter markets
that are large enough to sustain multiple chains. The chains take risk seriously. There are two
main components to risk, listed in the order of their importance:
1. Demand risk : Associated with sales and volume. Will their franchisees be able to sell enough
product to recover the costs associated with entry?
2. Cost risk : The physical land may not be conducive to building construction. One example
would be if soil conditions are poor, or if commodity prices uctuate a lot.
51The phone interview with Mark White of Wendys was conducted on October 22, 2009 (10:00 am), and the
phone interview with Patricia Simiele was conducted on November 22, 2010 (10:00 am). A face-to-face meeting with
Patricia Simiele was conducted at the McDonalds Canadian headquarters (2 McDonalds Place, Toronto) on March
31, 2011 at 10:30 am. A phone interview was also conducted with Melissa Pannozzo of Harveys on July 18, 2011.
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Figure 8: Map of Forward Sortation Area (FSA) subdivisions for the city of Toronto.
53
10 Appendix: Model of entry/exit with learning
10.1 Numerical example
For the numerical analysis, I will be looking at a simple case with J = 2 chains. Entry costs are
set to be the same for both of the chains, at ECi = ECj = 0:1, while their xed costs are set
to be zero (FCi = FCj = 0). The true market size is set to be Smt = 2 for all m and t. I set
1i = 1j = 1 = 1 and 2i = 2j = 2 = 0:5. They begin with a 0 = 0:5 prior probability of having
an incorrect assessment of market size. To solve the dynamic game under the parametrization above,
I obtain the Markov Perfect Equilibrium probabilities using a policy iteration approach under the
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) representation. As the posterior beliefs fall on the unit interval, I
discretize them over a unit interval.
This dynamic game may have multiple Markov Perfect equilibria. In this numerical example,
I have selected the (stable) equilibrium that I converge to when using policy iterations initialized
with a vector of choice probabilities with all the probabilities equal to 0.5. This selected equilibrium
has a non-negligible dominion of attraction in the sense that I converge to the same equilibrium
when I initialize the policy iteration algorithm with vectors of choice probabilities very di¤erent to
0.5.
10.1.1 Role of uncertainty in learning
I will now explore the role of ex ante uncertainty in learning. Intuitively, one would expect a
potential entrant facing signicant uncertainty to benet from learning. In many empirical studies
on social learning, preciseness of priors are often used to justify the presence of learning. To
some extent, this section validates this idea of using prior precision as a means for reduced form
identication. Most importantly, this section validates a statistic that I will rely on afterwards for
identication of learning. The most natural comparative static to consider would be to look at
how the learning e¤ect changes with the degree of ex ante uncertainty. Under the context of my
theoretical model, I rst dene the following objects
P (0; 1) = Pr(ait = 1jait 1 = 0; ajt 1 = 1; ajt 2 = 1; t 1 6= 0) (37)
P (0; 0) = Pr(ait = 1jait 1 = 0; ajt 1 = 0; ajt 2 = 1; t 1 6= 0)
P (1; 1) = Pr(ait = 1jait 1 = 1; ajt 1 = 1; ajt 2 = 1; t 1 = 0)
P (1; 0) = Pr(ait = 1jait 1 = 1; ajt 1 = 0; ajt 2 = 1; t 1 = 0):
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Figure 9: How does the degree of uncertainty a¤ect the learning e¤ect? The parameters used are
1 = 1, 2 = 0:5, EC = 0:1, S = 2 and 0 = 0:5.
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Relationship between ex ante uncertainty and learning effects
The rst case describes a scenario in which i is a potential entrant that has observed j stay in
the market at time t   1. The condition t 1 6= 0 ensures that i did not already learn the true
market size in the past. In contrast, the second case has the potential entrant observing j exiting
the market. The third scenario has incumbent i observing the decision of j to stay in the market.
As i is an incumbent, it has correct beliefs about the market size, as indicated by t 1 = 0. Finally,
the last case has incumbent i observing js decision to leave the market.
I now argue that the di¤erence in conditional probabilities fP (0; 1) P (0; 0)g fP (1; 1) P (1; 0)g
behaves like a learning e¤ect; showing this is worthwhile as this quantity will be used in the next
section to identify learning. Figure 5 illustrates the intuitive result. As jj increases, the learning
e¤ect also increases. In particular, the e¤ect is close to or slightly less than zero when  2 ( 0:2; 0:2)
and positive when  2 [ 1; 0:2) [ (0:2; 1]. It can be as high as 0.04 when  < 0 and 0.015 when
 > 0. These numbers seem reasonable, as my earlier estimates of learning have similar values.
10.1.2 Strategic delay
Standard models of learning in the spirit of Caplin and Leahy (1998) and Chamley and Gale
(1994) demonstrate that under the presence of information externalities, agents have an incentive
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Figure 10: How does the degree of forward looking a¤ect the learning e¤ect? The parameters used
are 1 = 1, 2 = 0:5, EC = 0:1, S = 2,  =  1 and 0 = 0:5.
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to delay their actions so as to take full advantage of these externalities. Given that my model allows
for forward looking behavior, a potential entrant has an option value associated with waiting. By
waiting, the potential entrant can obtain more information from the incumbents exit/stay decisions
and therefore, rene its posterior beliefs. These incentives should surface through the learning e¤ect.
I investigate strategic delay by running comparative statics on the discount factor, . The
exercise in the previous section is repeated, except now I plot the changes in the learning e¤ect
with respect to  2 (0; 1). Similar to the previous section, 1 = 1, 2 = 0:5, EC = 0:1, S = 2,
 =  1 and 0 = 0:5.
We see that for  2 (0; 0:6), the learning e¤ect is increasing. In the static case, rms receive no
future benet from entering markets; so continuation values may increase the probability of entry,
and hence, increase the learning e¤ect. However, for  2 (0:6; 1), the learning e¤ect is actually
decreasing. As I make future payo¤s more important, I am essentially increasing the option value
of waiting at the same time. Therefore, the incentive to enter immediately following an incumbent
rivals exit/stay decision is weighed against the future payo¤ conditional on more information.
The result pertaining to the region  2 (0:6; 1) is perhaps more applicable, as discount factors in
dynamic discrete choice models are typically calibrated at 0.95 or above.
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Figure 11: How does uncertainty a¤ect industry dynamics? The parameters used are 1 = 1,
2 = 0:5, EC = 0:1, S = 2 and 0 = 0:5. For the case with no uncertainty,  = 0, and the case with
uncertainty has  =  1. The expected number of active rms is dened as 1500
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10.1.3 Implications of learning on industry dynamics
What do industry dynamics look like with or without information externalities? In particular, can
an industrys growth be accelerated by learning from competitors? I explore these questions by
running a simulation using the model.
The two cases I explore are when rms face uncertainty about markets ( =  1) or when rms
face no uncertainty about markets ( = 0). Remaining parameters are set at the same values as in
the previous comparative static exercise. To perform the simulation, I randomly generate the i.i.d.
extreme value shocks "it for 500 markets. Combined with the numerical solution to the dynamic
game, I can generate a sequence of active/not decisions for the rms across all markets over the
course of 50 years. I assume that in the rst year, there are no rms active in any of the markets.
These sequences are then used to tabulate the total number of markets with active rms over time.
When rms face no uncertainty about the markets, the expected number of active rms imme-
diately goes up to about 0.5 after the rst year, and uctuates around that level over time. A very
di¤erent picture emerges when uncertainty is introduced. Although this quantity converges towards
0.5 in the long run52 under the scenario with learning, it does not happen immediately. This result
52 I use the word long run loosely, as one may expect learning to have a level e¤ect on the long run equilibrium. That
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is similar to Rob (1991), in which his equilibrium exhibits a di¤usion process.53 There are two
possible reasons for which the model can generate di¤usion. The rst reason is that a potential
entrant uses the observed decisions of a rival incumbent to update its beliefs about the market
(i.e., time-to-learn). It may however take time before the updated posterior reaches some level that
makes the perceived net benet of being active positive. Alternatively, a potential entrant may
delay entering markets, as entering later confers greater benet associated with the information
externality from the rst entrants stay/exit decisions (i.e., strategic delay).
The di¤usion of rms also exhibits a logarithmic pattern. Growth is fastest initially, but then
slows down as the industry matures. This pattern can be reconciled with the learning story.
Initially, the two rms face uncertainty in virtually all of the markets. However, this uncertainty
will be resolved either through their own entry decisions, or the past exit/stay decisions of the
rival. Over time, there will be fewer and fewer uncertain markets to receive favorable signals about,
thus, posterior beliefs in mature markets uctuate very little. This result is related to one of my
conditions used for identication: information externalities should only be identied in situations
in which past learning has not already occurred.
I now digress by going back to the Canadian fast food data to illustrate how the simulated
industry dynamics establishes a "footprint" for learning. The data allows me to plot the evolution
of the expected number of active rms. Unlike the model, population across markets and time
is not xed. So I group markets based on which population quartile54 they belong to. Figure 8
illustrates that the evolution of Canadas fast food industry also exhibits a pattern of di¤usion.
The models di¤usion is a bit faster though when compared with some of the subplots. In the
model, the expected number is between 0.4 to 0.5 after about 30 years, while the data produces a
number between 0.3 and 0.4 for the rst three quartiles. One explanation that is consistent with
learning is that the opportunity value of delayed entry should be larger as the number of other
chains increases.55
said, I caution the reader from extrapolating the results for too long of a time horizon. Nevertheless, the relevance
of my results for the long run may not be too important, as industries in general die out eventually.
53He describes the process as a scenario in which entry occurs gradually, and a long run equilibrium is eventually
established, but not immediately.
54 In particular, I use the average population across time.
55Five chains in the actual data versus two chains in the numerical exercise.
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Figure 12: A time series plot of the expected number of active rms, 1608
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Table 21: The e¤ect that McDonalds information externality has on the other chains.
A & W Burger King Harveys Wendys
McDonalds 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
11 Appendix: Identication of information externalities
11.1 Learning from McDonalds
My identication strategy is unable to uncover learning e¤ects associated with past entry decisions
of McDonalds. This shortcoming may be of some concern, as McDonalds is thought of as a leader
in terms of real estate research and location choices. Therefore, McDonalds past entry decisions
may in fact be informative. I modify the di¤erencing estimator so as to exploit the following
variation in my data: McDonalds may open more than one outlet within a particular FSA. One
can then distinguish between the decision of McDonalds to add more stores, or simply stay in the
market it has entered. Therefore, the potentially informative signal is from a+MCDmt 1 2 f0; 1g,
which indicates whether McDonalds opened more stores at t   1 after being active at time t   2.
As before, the learning e¤ect is identied by the same double-di¤erence as the intuition behind the
di¤erencing remains the same, in that the rst quantity captures both non-learning and learning
e¤ects, while the second quantity captures only non-learning e¤ects.
The estimates reveal that McDonalds does exert some information externality onto others, in
particular, A & W and Burger King. McDonalds information externality can increase A & Ws
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Table 22: The e¤ect that McDonalds demand externalities, competition e¤ects and unobserved
heterogeneity has on the other chains.
A & W Burger King Harveys Wendys
McDonalds 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
probability of entry by 2 percentage points, while increase Burger Kings probability of entry by 1.
11.2 Calculating standard errors for double-di¤erence decomposition
The double-di¤erence decomposition I propose does not yield standard errors in a simple manner.
To assess the statistical signicance of learning, I consider a exible random e¤ects logit model that
captures the learning e¤ect as a parameter. To identify the learning e¤ect, we need the following
double-di¤erence:
 = f ~V (0; 1)  ~V (0; 0)g   f ~V (1; 1)  ~V (1; 0)g: (38)
Label ~V (0; 1) = V 01i , ~V (0; 0) = V
00
i , ~V (1; 1) = V
11
i , and ~V (1; 0) = V
10
i . These objects can be
estimated via a random e¤ects logit estimation of the following:
P (aimt = 1) = ((1  aimt 1)(1  ajmt 1)V 00i + (1  aimt 1)ajmt 1V 01i (39)
+aimt 1(1  ajmt 1)V 10i + aimt 1ajmt 1V 11i +Zmti + m)
Here, m is unobserved market heterogeneity that I address using the random e¤ects. Note that
I have to rst rearrange the terms in order to obtain the double-di¤erence . After expanding the
terms and rearranging them, we get:
P (aimt = 1) = (V
00
i + (aimt 1 + ajmt 1)(V
10
i   V 00i )  aimt 1ajmt 1 +Zmti + m) (40)
Therefore,  can be estimated and its standard errors can be easily obtained as well. As before,
we need to condition our estimation sample on unexplored markets for which exit/stay decisions of
rival j are observed.
The results show that the information externalities can be precisely identied for certain chains.
In particular, the estimates of  are positive and least noisy for A & W and Burger King. In fact,
the learning e¤ects are statistically signicant for A & W at the 1% level. Also note that the
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Table 23: The role of information externalities using exible logit. Here, column pertains to chain i,
and row pertains to is rival j. Note that the information externalities associated with McDonalds
past stay/exit decisions is not identied as their exit is virtually negligible. Standard errors appear
in brackets.
A & W Burger King Harveys McDonalds Wendys
A & W 5.1 (0.53) -0.12 (0.37) -1.1 (0.28) -0.22 (1.9) -0.04 (0.42)
Burger King 4.2 (0.50) 0.30 (0.46) -0.63 (0.34) -0.46 (1.9) 0.38 (0.50)
Harveys 6.9 (0.20) 0.11 (0.48) -0.83 (0.50) 0.06 (2.0) -0.65 (0.47)
McDonalds N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wendys 2.9 (0.46) 0.65 (0.42) -0.007 (0.36) -0.06 (1.9) -0.60 (0.60)
non-evidence for learning is precise for Harveys, as its estimates of  are negative and statisti-
cally signicant at the 10% level. These ndings are consistent with the original double-di¤erence
decomposition results, where we nd no evidence of learning for Harveys, and relatively stronger
evidence of learning for A & W. Furthermore, both the signs and the statistical signicance of
these results are consistent with the counterfactual nding where A & W values most a reduction
in uncertainty, while Harveys values least a reduction in uncertainty.
61
